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The night which made the Czechs and Slovaks stop loving Russia

34

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After the Great Hibernation

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NO COMMENT

ANDREI BILJO

A SOVIET WEEKLY

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

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

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

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Associate editors:
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From our mailbag

■ "The party organizations of the region must come out against the forced capitalization of the country, compulsory privatization, rejection of the Marxist-Leninist methodology, and the slander of the history of this country and the Communist Party."

This is an excerpt from the resolution of the joint plenary session of the Moscow Region Party Committee and the CPSU Control Commission in which I participated. Both the overt and secret aspirations of the governing party structures are reflected in this quotation as in a mirror.

Although not often, the delegates to the plenary session could also hear other kind of talk. For example, this is what was stated by the chairman of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Control Commission Stolyarov: "The 17 percent of votes that were given to Ryzhkov by the people of Russia is, in fact, our rating, the level of our real authority." But the plenum did not heed one of the few sensible people in the party leadership.

I recall the events at the previous joint plenary session held on March 12 when Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee O.S. Shenin called on the regional party organizations to leave no stone unturned in their efforts to "ruin the Russian referendum and change the leadership at the congress of people's deputies." And he was applauded... But the governing party bodies have a short memory! The referendum, the congress of people's deputies, and the election of the president of Russia have been held. The results are known. But instead of giving an objective assessment of their own performance, the plenum participants stigmatized apostates and those who have doubts. It is not by accident that at a recent press conference the following portentous words escaped the lips of one of the party leaders: "I shall hold out for as long as my jaw lasts me."

Convinced that those who long ago concluded that the existing party patterns are unable to undergo transformation are right, I declared from the rostrum of the joint plenary session that I was not going to participate in its work and left the hall. At the same time I remain in the party for I see the last chance to make at least part of it useful for the society – through the creation of the Democratic Party of the Communists of Russia.

Gennady Dernovoi
Moscow Region, USSR

■ I can give a very concrete answer to the question put by Tatiana Ivanova (No.17/91) as to what the CPSU is doing now, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both in the USSR and abroad, it has been violating the Law of the USSR "On public associations" that came into force January 1, 1991. Literally disregarding the provisions of Article 4 of the Law, the committees of the CPSU, with the assistance of the administration, interfere in the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' organizations abroad. Had the organizations of the CPSU, which have found a niche for themselves in the Soviet missions abroad, not been occupied with making decisions on matters of official business, they would have had nothing to justify their existence in the system of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or in any other state organization. The CPSU interferes especially actively in personnel questions. The Foreign Ministry authorities, who are de facto subordinate to the CPSU, do not even think about putting an end to that illegal

It is not good to steal after all

■ In article "The KGB about the KBG" published in *Pravda*, the first deputy chief of the External Intelligence Directorate of the USSR Committee for State Security V. Firpichenko wrote: "All intelligence services in the world take an interest in the achievements of science and technology. The Soviet intelligence also lays great store by work in this field which is needed for this country's defence and economy. I would say that had we applied everything that we obtained, we would have lived much better."

It seems that *Pravda* editors have such great respect for the KGB that they have not even realized what it was all about. What we are talking about here is theft. The things that they "obtain" are simply stolen things that have been acquired by deception or any other unlawful means. In all civilized countries industrial espionage is punishable by law. And the deputy chief of the KGB External Intelligence Directorate should have known that it is simply impossible to apply in this country's "national economy," with the exception, probably, of the military-industrial complex, all the things that have been "obtained." And it is not the KGB that holds the golden key to the door behind which the good life awaits us. One can disregard international legal norms to protect industrial and intellectual property behind the high fences of the military-industrial complex, but not in the civilian sector of the economy. And, of course, not when we are about to create a single economic market with the West.

The best way to doom your science to lag behind and stagnate is to live by other people's minds, to steal ideas and industrial designs from abroad. Sooner or later, the momentary benefit will undoubtedly yield negative results: one's own Newtons and Platos will be either underpaid or find themselves not wanted at all.

So, the statement by the high-ranking KGB official does not stir in me legitimate pride, firstly because one should break the habit of filching anything that can be stolen. And secondly, according to foreign specialists, the question of the protection of intellectual property in the USSR can become a more serious obstacle to the development of international trade than the embargo imposed by the notorious COCOM.

P. Nikulin, Candidate of Sciences (Law)
Moscow, USSR

Party life: on the question of holding out

Diplomats wage a losing battle

Ingush "nationalists" and Cossack executives



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

practice. The prime victims of the party apparatchiks' tyranny are diplomats who believe in reforms and wage a losing battle against the CPSU dictate in the Foreign Ministry and eventually leave that party.

The activities of the CPSU organizations in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs continue to be financed from the state budget. For example, to this day the huge apparatus of the CPSU committees in Soviet organizations in Mongolia is being supported at the expense of the state budgetary means, including those in hard currency. Their staff receives their salaries and travel allowances from the Foreign Ministry budget. The Ministry bears the expenses connected with the maintenance of offices and apartments occupied by the CPSU staff, provision of transportation and communication services, stationary, foodstuffs, furniture, and clerical aids. The activities of CPSU organizations in Soviet organizations abroad are conducted during working hours, which distracts party members from work. The losses sustained by the state as a result of the CPSU activities in the USSR Foreign Ministry's organizations abroad amount to tens, if not hundreds of thousands of dollars annually.

V.Oshurkov,
consul at the USSR Consulate General in Choibalsan,
Mongolia

On Russian patriotism

■ Thank you very much for the article by Geoffrey Hosking "The Russian myth: empire and people" (No. 12/91). In his reflections the British author goes deeper into the problem than many Soviet journalists writing about Russia.

Public opinion is divided – one position is adopted by those who don't see any community of the USSR and the RSFSR, and the other – by those for whom this is one and the same thing. Yet all of them are patriots. Is it possible that we really still have two kinds of patriotism as Geoffrey Hosking puts it – that of the people living in Russia and that of the Russians? Or, which is one and the same thing, patriotism of the USSR and patriotism of the RSFSR? And maybe there also exists the third kind of patriotism – the Slavophile one?

It seemed to me that there is some reason why Hosking writes about the "Slavophiles" – he wants to explain the position of those people who simultaneously come out in favour of the USSR and the RSFSR. Simply speaking they are for Russia. In my view, "Slavophile idea" will provide for the Slavic peoples (Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians) the basis which will make it possible for them to reunite as a single people. This idea will also help reconcile us with the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe – from the times of General Skobelev the Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, and Serbs have been grateful for the support of their liberation struggle, and not only for the liberation from Hitler's tyranny as it has until very recently been propagandized in this country.

I cannot agree that the Russian Empire was the "prison of peoples." The Slavic people have set for other nations an example of life in concord. I think that the USSR is not the "prison of peoples" either if one implies the USSR to be the same federative formation as is the RSFSR. For in the RSFSR, autonomous republics, autonomous territories and autonomous regions are all equal. They are united by the same Slavic kinship. The framework of the 15 republics has become too small for the peoples of the USSR: there is a need for new administrative and territorial patterns. We can unite on the basis of national patriotism that existed in the Russian Empire and that remained in the RSFSR after the October Revolution and is being preserved in the USSR up to this day. The basis of that patriotism is the "Slavophile idea" that we have forgotten about or have been made to forget. An example of this oblivion is provided by the neglected grave and country estate of the hero of the Russian-Turkish wars and the inspirer of the struggle of the Slavs for their liberation, General Skobelev.

For the time being we don't have the new Aksakov brothers. In my view, even Solzhenitsyn has failed to reach their level of spirituality. But we shall certainly have them – "the Russian spirit" and "the Slavic spirit" will never cease to exist.

Anatoly Karpus,
physician
Ryazan, USSR

■ I am sending you material from two different newspapers. One of them (from the newspaper *Domostroi)* recounts the killing by "the Ingush nationalists" of the Tersk Cossacks. On Easter, the ataman of the Sunzhensk department of the Tersk Cossacks, Alexander Podkolzin, died at their hands. And *Komsomolets Kubani* published an article by a man who signed; "unfortunately, a Don Cossack." He recounts his conversation with "a Cossack executive." That man called the local people (Ingushes and representatives of other minorities) "wild beasts." So, I thought: Can there be a certain connection between these two facts?

V.Adamov,
Krasnodar, USSR

■ Nowadays everyone knows about the forcible annexation of the Baltics by Stalin. It is also known that this process was accompanied by tremendous repressions. Today's bloodshed in Lithuania perpetrated by the Union troops reminds one of the continuation of that policy. This has only aggravated the ethnic enmity of the Baltic people towards Russians. Hence nationalism in the Baltics has been brewing for decades on end. And one cannot blame the Baltic peoples for that: our own actions have boomeranged.

V.Kushakov, engineer
Krasnoyarsk Territory, USSR

***Compiled by* Tatiana Chernova**

NATION

WHAT IS GOING ON

They've staged a putsch, but their hands are trembling



Photos by Valery Miloserdov, Vladimir Svartsevich, Dmitry Khrupov, Dmitry Borko

The citadel of Russian freedom

The hopes of all those to whom freedom is dear are connected with the Russian White House (the seat of the president and the parliament of Russia), with the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic, with Boris Yeltsin. The Russian White House has been an example of heroism since the very beginning of the putsch. The word heroism, which has been devalued by frequent use, should in this case be understood literally, as a notion incorporating nobleness, resolution, courage, the determination to assume full responsibility, and restraint.

Moral fortitude has not once failed Yeltsin. In the early hours after the putsch he declared he did not believe in Gorbachev's sudden illness and demanded that the legitimate president of the USSR be returned to power. Yeltsin called a putsch a putsch. He issued a decree in which he assumed full responsibility for the situation in Russia. He decreed that any official cooperating with the putschists committed a criminal offence and was criminally liable. He addressed the armed forces. How could he deliver his address when the putschists controlled all the media and all communications channels? Yeltsin went out of his office and climbed on top of a tank to deliver his speech. Chairman of the Russian Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, calmly and coolly called the putschists state criminals. General Kobets, chairman of Yeltsin's defence committee briefly stated that the main thing was to hold out through the first night after the putsch. When asked by a Radio Liberty correspondent whether he thought the pro-Yeltsin forces would hold out, Gen. Kobets said he had no doubt about it. We are professionals, in such situations, we either win, or shoot ourselves. We will win.

Yeltsin called for a general political strike lasting as long as the junta was in power. People's deputies and followers of the Democratic Russia movement circulated the Yeltsin call throughout the country by phone and by distributing leaflets. Once again, the Russian White House demanded that Gorbachev be allowed to appear on the national TV and radio and this time the wording of the demand was much tougher. In these fatal moments Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev – if he is still alive – will know where nobleness, loyalty, friendship, cynical calculation, treason, the interests of the nation, and the unbridled desire for power at any price belong. Many people will learn the truth about themselves and others in these fateful hours. Our old knowledge is worth nothing compared with what we have just learned.

The citadel of Russian freedom, headed by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is alive and fighting. As long as it holds on, the nation and the whole world can still hope. Even Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, easily this century's most outstanding politician, can still hope. Even he.

Tatiana Ivanova

The appearance of Dictatorship before the people

August 19. We want to commit this day to memory exactly as we lived it, and ourselves – exactly as we were then. It was a day we thought was impossible. We waved aside the possibility like a bad dream. But it has come to pass. Perhaps we all allowed it to happen?

Galina Sidorova

4:00 a.m. The alarm is sounded. The command: "To the vehicles!" 18-year-old boys in their first year of army service rub their eyes as they leap into tanks and armoured personnel carriers. They don't know what awaits them. Within a few hours the boys are already in Moscow, peering with bewilderment from their frightening piles of metal and showing no less bewildered passers-by the empty magazines of their submachine guns. Close by in the trucks lie boxes of cartridges.

12:00. Troops surrounding Manezhnaya Square and the approaches to the Kremlin. I arrive at the Foreign Policy Association, where Eduard Shevardnadze and People's Deputies Alexander Vladislavlev, deputy chairman of the Scientific-Industrial Union of the USSR, and Mikhail Minasbekyan, leader of the group "Soglasiye" of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, are busy with an appeal of the Council of the Movement for Democratic Reforms. The long thought-out document was born in a hurry: "In the country, an unconstitutional coup has taken place. It is still not clear how this happened...

We demand that the President immediately appear before the people.

...The first statements issued by those who seized power and the stationing of troops in Moscow, and obviously in other places as well, attests to the attempt to throw aside the country's constitution, to crush democracy, and to limit the freedoms of the people.

The Emergency Committee is speculating about existing difficulties and promises to solve all problems, to bring the country out of the present crisis. This is deceit. These people have absolutely nothing with which to fulfil such a promise. They have only force and the inevitable repressions.

The initiators of the coup are mistaken if they think that the army will fight against its brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers. We are sure that the majority of them will

refuse to become instruments of terror. ...This coup is proceeding according to the plan which was worked out for the Baltics, where the "Salvation Committee" first appeared. Now such a committee has seized control of the entire country.

...We are certain that the democratic forces of our Fatherland, all those who do not want a return to totalitarianism, to the times of terror, oppose the unconstitutional actions of the self-proclaimed "leadership of the country." And with us will be all of progressive humanity.

The Movement for Democratic Reforms supports the statements of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and intends to closely cooperate with those who choose freedom, democracy and human dignity.

The Movement demands that in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and a Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR be called immediately."

13:30. Shevardnadze, Vladislavlev, Minasbekyan and I leave the headquarters of the Movement for Democratic Reforms. The car can hardly squeeze its way through the crowded Moscow streets. Next to a store where the unappetizing sign "Chicken" hangs is a depressing line – 50 people are waiting. Closed commission stores. A few old women make up a poor market. Close by a group of people eagerly yet hurriedly read a piece of paper posted on a fence by one of the opposition parties. From time to time passers-by with small radios are seen – just like during the time of the very first Congress of People's Deputies. In order to get downtown we violate the rules and proceed across the pedestrian Stoleshnikov Street. A diverse crowd meets us with dispirited, exhausted faces. People are obviously trying not to notice the alien metal bodies on the streets they've loved from their childhood.

Suddenly I clearly envision the streets of Tbilisi. I remember how we drove through those streets April 10, 1989, just after the tragedy. Then the tanks had seemed monstrous to me – incongruous decorations in that peaceful southern city. I encountered a woman with dark eyes full of pain, hate and bewilderment: how could such a thing happen?

14:00. We safely reach the headquarters of the Movement in the Minsk Hotel. We try to determine what is taking place and where, and who is where. Russian radio and television are already blocked, as is the independent press. Consequently, information is being passed from hand to hand and by word of mouth. Young people bring statements of vairous democratic parties and organizations discussing the coup. It is revealed that Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov is trying to return from vacation. Nothing is heard from Yakovlev and Volsky doesn't appear. The news from the White House: Yeltsin emerged and from a tank appealed to the crowd and to the soldiers. But in spite of the excitement, in the Movement's headquarters there is great perplexity. Did the democrats have no time, or desire, or strength to unite?..

16:00. We return to the Foreign Policy Association. It's drizzling. It's as though they're trying to clean from the streets the defiling caterpillar tracks. Shevardnadze sadly looks out the window – less than

(Cont. on p. 10)

And then there were eight

Gorbachev's former aides

Marina Shakina



YANAEV, Gennady Ivanovich, born 1937, Cand. of History (*Pravda*, December 28, 1990), Cand. of Law (reference book *Narodniye Deputaty SSSR*, Moscow, 1990). Russian.

Worked as a Komsomol functionary for 17 years. In 1980 appointed Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries. In 1986 he was transferred to the trade unions and worked as Secretary, Deputy Chairman and Chairman of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions.

Elected Politburo member and Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee. Elected in December 1990 Vice-President of the USSR at the 4th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, on Gorbachev's insistence, after a second round of voting.

PAVLOV, Valentin Sergeyevich, born 1937, Russian. Graduated from a financial institute and started his career as a finance inspector. His career in finance climaxed with his appointment as Minister of Finance of the USSR. Worked as Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Prices. Appointed Prime Minister of the USSR this year by Gorbachev. His name is associated with April's drastic price hike.



BAKLANOV, Oleg Dmitriyevich, born 1932, Ukrainian, graduated from the All-Union Extramural Institute of Power Generation. In 1976 appointed Deputy Minister of General Machine-Building of the USSR, and later, First Deputy Minister. Promoted to Minister in 1983. Elected Central Committee Secretary in charge of the defence industry in 1988. First Deputy Chairman of the Defence Council.

YAZOV, Dmitry Timofeyevich, born 1923, Russian. Joined the Soviet Army in 1941, took part in action during WW2. Appointed Defence Minister of the USSR in 1987 following the Mathias Rust landing on Red Square and Gorbachev's firing of Defence Minister Sokolov.

Elected Alternative Member of the CPSU Central Committee. When insisting on his candidacy, Gorbachev tried to convince the deputies that the post of Defence Minister was not all that important

Classical music was played on the radio over and over again on the morning of Monday, August 19. Our experienced people immediately started wondering who had died. The sudden affection for classical music is a sure sign of a death in the top row. Then the broadcast switched to Russian folk songs and songs of other peoples of the USSR. However, what was announced was not anyone's death, but something more unusual: the package of declarations of the newly-formed State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR: a new organization that had assumed all power in the country.

What's wrong with the President?

First of all it was declared that an illness prevented Mikhail Gorbachev from carrying out his presidential duties. Nothing more was said about the President: the illness was not specified, nothing was said about when Gorbachev fell ill and there was no report from Gorbachev's personal doctor. It remains unknown where exactly Gorbachev is located now, while the Committee is still reluctant to release any official information. Society is organized so that when there is no reliable information, rumours and speculations appear and spread with surprising rapidity. One of the Committee's documents, Decree No. 1, contains a paragraph stipulating liability for "dissemination of inflamatory rumours." First the Committee created a breeding ground for roumours, and then declared punishment for spreading them.

The first information about what the developments were really like was provided not by the declaration made up of universal and familiar set expressions used in almost any official statement ("the country is going out of control," "the people are denied the right to decision-making," "generous flows of promises and a scarcity of practical actions," "the threat of an uncontrolled personal dictatorship"). These set expressions can be used in any text from a declaration of the radical democratic opposition to a monarchist leaflet. The first information was provided by the list of names of Committee members.

The State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR is made up of people who used to be among Gorbachev's closest aides. Practically all of them, except for Yanayev, have been known to harshly criticize the Gorbachevian policies. The most recent example of such criticism is the "Supreme Soviet mutiny," when Premier Pavlov demanded extraordinary powers and the Defence Minister, the Interior Minister and the KGB chief supported him. This happened when Gorbachev was out of Moscow. But even after this brazen demarche – criticism of the President and the demand for extraordinary powers without his knowledge – the rebel ministers remained in their places.

First versions

An analysis of the package of documents circulated by the Committee through the official news agency TASS did not reveal the main mystery: what happened in the country that made it necessary to impose a state of emergency? Neither the documents, furnished any explanations, except very general words about the country's approaching a catastrophe. Crime, shortages, corruption, ethnic violence – all this had existed before. These problems are everyday headaches of the Pavlov Cabinet, after all the Cabinet's reason for existence is to professionally solve such problems without any panic. What new developments could there have been to necessitate the imposition of a state of emergency? There is no answer.

Some guesses are possible, though. It can be felt from the text of the declaration that the developments were somehow connected with the signing of the new Union Treaty scheduled for August 20. One sentence in the declaration mentioned the violation of the will of the people, expressed in the March 17 referendum. This is difficult to understand: what kind of violation could there be, if the new Union Treaty was to be signed soon? However, the unfavourable opinion of the new treaty expressed by Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and broadcast over the radio and television every half hour along with the declaration of the state of emergency committee, that the new leadership felt sour about the Union Treaty. The **first version** explaining the developments could be the **great-power idea** backing up the putschists' actions.

Tested recipes

Referring to Decree No. 1, one must admit that it contains a lot of attractive promises – lower prices, for instance, concern for the working people's rights, which were mentioned as the main reasons for the imposition of the state of emergency. It is not clear, however, how personal searches and bans on people quitting jobs if they feel like it (which is rumoured to already be in



force in Leningrad) correspond to these promises. Lower prices on goods that can't be found is no great comfort either. Pavlov increased the prices recently, and now he imposes a state of emergency to lower the prices? That's what one calls bizarre economics.

The programme of actions described in Decree No. 1 is pleasing to the ear, but it is vague and too similar to the government documents of the Brezhnev era, where the usual recipes were "measures to improve people's housing conditions," "to maintain a thrifty economy," "to fight corruption," "to do everything possible to solve the problems of the power-generating complex," "to save the harvest," etc. One can't help remembering the Food Programme and the programme Housing-2000 that have been buried ignominiously. Such strategic tasks were mapped out in this country every year. Nonetheless, little has changed for the better in the past seventy-three years.

A **second version** is self-evident. Perhaps the Committee has found some new way to achieve all those bright objectives described in the declaration? And the Committee assumed power mindful that no one else knew that way for which the imposition of a state of emergency is the necessary condition? This panacea, however, is nowhere to be found in the declaration. The recipes are all the same: sterner labour discipline, new approaches, rigid control, and order. The press conference of the Committee members confirmed this – Interior Minister Pugo said openly that he would not invent any new ways to fight crime even in a state of emergency. Approximately the same was said about the economic problems – the participants in the news conference did not offer any explanations where they would get the money necessary for a drastic improvement of health care and the land necessary to give anyone wishing to go in for private small-scale farming 0.15 hectares.

Decree No. 1 is a blow to those who tend to see "Communist intrigues" everywhere. The Committee's documents contain no word about "the socialist choice," "the leading role of the CPSU," etc. Private ownership is mentioned rather loyally together with other legal forms of entrepreneurship. On the other hand, all the newspapers allowed for publication except *Izvestia* and the Soviet Army daily, *Krasnaya Zvezda,* belong to the Communist Party, although political parties were declared dissolved. This must be a coincidence, though.

My friend Gorbachev

The press conference of Committee members brought a surprise: the head of the Committee, Yanayev, assured the journalists that everything had happened nearly with Gorbachev's own blessing and that as soon as he recuperated, Gorbachev would join them. (Yanayev called Gorbachev "his friend.") The press conference shattered all the preliminary versions, because the Committee was alleged to have been formed to facilitate the Gorbachevian reforms. The participants also said the Soviet Union's foreign policy would not be revised, the USSR stayed loyal to its international commitments, the model of the Soviet Union as a voluntary union of sovereign states would not be reconsidered by the new leadership. The logical question is: why all this fuss, then?

Why so much fuss if the Committee's only purpose is to continue the reforms? Only **one version remains: the personal or group ambitions of the members of the Committee.** Their actions are aimed at the preservation of the power of the highest state and bureaucratic elite which has close personal ties with the CPSU apparatus (many Committee members used to work in the highest communist Party bodies) that is why it is not surprising that the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia hastened to recognize the Yanayev committee.

Some contradictions in the Yanayev utterings and Decree No. 1 suggest that the Committee is actively using the great-power chauvinistic sentiments and ideas widely popular in the army, among war veterans, and national-patriots. However, the committee has not yet dared to publicly state their advocacy of the idea, fearing an unavoidable confrontation with the republics and international public opinion. All the other promises of the Committee are classic social demagoguery. And the intonation of the Committee documents is insulting to all of us: they betray the putschists' belief that the people only understand force and will remain slaves forever.

KRYUCHKOV, Vladimir Alexandrovich, born 1924, Russian, graduated from the All-Union Extramural Institute of Law and the High Diplomatic School of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Started his career in 1941 when he was a factory worker. Started working for the CPSU Central Committee in 1959 as a expert, later promoted to sector head and assistant to a CC Secretary. Started holding key positions in the KGB in 1967. Appointed Deputy Chairman of the KGB in 1978, and Chairman of the KGB in 1988. General of the Army. Used to be seen as a person close to Yury Andropov and later, Mikhail Gorbachev.

PUGO, Boris Karlovich, born 1937, Lett. Worked as an engineer after graduation from the Riga Polytechnic College in 1960. Spent a number of years working as a Komsomol and CPSU functionary. Offered a position in the KGB system in 1976. Appointed Chairman of the KGB of Latvia in 1980. General. Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Among other functions, heads the OMON force.

STARODUBTSEV, Vasily Alexandrovich, born 1931, Russian. Graduated from the All-Union Extramural Institute of Agriculture in 1966. Cand. of Agriculture, corresponding member of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the USSR. Chairman of the All-Russia Council of Collective Farms, elected Chairman of the Peasants' Union in June 1990.

TIZYAKOV, Alexander Ivanovich, born 1926, Russian, CPSU member. Worked as Ditector General of the Sverdlovsk based scientific and industrial association Mashinostroitelny Zavod Imeni Kalinina. Elected President of the Association of State Enterprises and Industrial, Construction, Transport and Communication Facilities of the USSR in 1991. One of the authors of *The Word to the Nation* **published in** *Sovetskaya Rossiya* **and containing the demand for the "restoration of order" in the country.**

(Cont. from p.7)

anyone in the world did he want to see his prediction come true. "Why did this happen?"

"It's probably a natural law. At critical moments it is crucial to have the correct orientation and to act decisively. The constant vascillations and indecisiveness that have characterized our society for the last year and a half have inevitably led us to cataclism." "Evidently it played its role in the isolation of democratic forces?" "If the initiator of democratization wanted to be sure that the democrats weren't going to be isolated, he needed to have done a lot. I understand that he is in a very hard position now, but he is also to blame. He did not take advantage of the one opportunity to support the democrats, to strengthen their position."

"What is there to do now?"

"In order to preserve the achievements of the last years and to avert a civil war, the only sure way is to unite the forces of all democrats, reformers, all honest, organized people, including those in the army, in the security organs, in the organs of internal affairs. My hopes rest on the support of miners, builders and metalworkers. Only a democratic structure can guarantee normal human living conditions for every worker. I figure that students will have their say. It is necessary to appeal to the people at all costs. If the people reject democratic institutions, there's nothing you can do – it's hopeless. But I believe that our peole are wise and will act decisively."

"What do you mean by decisiveness?"

"To dispell adventurers."

"How?"

"Through the Supreme Soviet, through the Congress of People's Deputies. I'm not suggesting that they be put in prison. Even in spite of the fact that they are conspirators. They just need to be taught a lesson. Dispel them and select a normal government."

"Do you think this is possible without the use of force?"

"It's not late yet. Let the congress convene. We're not calling for armed resistance, because we know what that leads to, when on the one side there are unarmed civilians and on the other the armed strength of the Soviet Union. We need to employ strikes and demonstrations. In principle I am against strikes, because a country cannot live under constant pressure. Any pause in the work of an enterprise or organization hits the working man in the pocket. Now there are major things that are at stake. They must be salvaged."

"Do you personally believe that people who are tired of promises, who have no faith and no strength, can take any resolute action?"

"I do not think that the recent years have been wasted. I think people can analyse the developments and understand the danger that is looming over the country. I regard the coup as a national tragedy for the peoples of the Soviet Union, and I think it is a threat to global peace and stability. Look at the contemptuous remarks addressed to Western powers which are contained in the Committee's declaration. It seems that nothing at all has changed lately in international relations. Where are they going to buy 35 or 40 million tons of grain? The harvest is thin. The country is headed for hunger. It will not be possible to feed the people without that grain – no matter whether it comes from, the East or the West. All their promises are demagoguery, pure and simple.

"How would you explain the absence of Anatoly Lukyanov's name on the list of the putschists? Do you think it may be a shrewd political game, Lukyanov's attempt to perform Gorbachev's part?"

"I think it may be the formal division of authority. On the other hand, Lukyanov might have decided that it was more becoming to him to act independently."

"What do you think can be expected from the Supreme Soviet which will soon convene?"

"The Supreme Soviet is not Lukyanov personally, not only him... Lukyanov...

18:30. Tanks are rolling past on Pushkin Square. The tank columns are not long, but they roar past quite often.

21:00. Nobody leaves the office. We decide to put out the issue as usual. It would appear on Thursday. It is all agreed on. Still we are all pacing up and down the Editor-in-Chief's office which has become our headquarters. We are looking for a pretext to be together a little longer.

Everything is as usual. Some of us try to hide our anxiety with jokes, others are unusually serious. I am looking in the eyes of my colleagues who are very different people, but who have all become closely related in the past few hours. People with hardly compatible characters and different visions have blended together feeling the joy and stress of our necessary creativity. Our little team that made our own *New Times* for the first time.

That evening we looked at each other as if trying to absorb each other's appearance, to remember each other for what we were: a little crazy and a bit too difficult, the way we used to be in happier times.

We say goodbye to each other. There is still something to write for this issue at night. Impersonal narrations of the events? But all the events occur not only around us, but to us as well. "What will happen tomorrow?" is the silent question in my friend's eyes.

Barricades on Presnya

Journalistic intuition is sometimes surprisingly accurate. On August 17, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* carried an article, entitled "Are We Having a Coup?" although the subject of the article was different. But the coup was just around the corner.

The evening of August 19, I was visiting friends and was about to say goodbye when I found out that my friends, a young couple, were going to the Russian White House on Presnya. They had spent the whole day there building barricades "like Lenin at a Subbotnik," and were taking food there.

I asked them to take me along. It is not good to be too curious on days like that, even for a journalist, but bringing some apples and tomatoes to the defenders seemed the right thing to do.

Ironically, we have grown up on the barricades. The legendary Gavroche was our first hero, and when we were kids at school and were too lazy to wash the floors properly, a teacher might tell us: "We are on the different sides of the barricade, you and me." Our vision of the world was separated by barricades, iron curtains, sealed borders. Our vision of the world was divided into "ours" and "not ours."

The Leningrad TV cowboy Nevzorov, bursting with patriotic zeal, had nearly defamed the good word "ours" with his reports from the Baltics.

On the evening of the nineteenth, the word "ours" was cleansed and revived. It turned out to be a uniting, not a separating word. Everybody was "ours" outside the Russian White House, and tanks were "ours," too. Everybody kept repeating, "these are our tanks, our tanks..."

Our tanks looked exactly as the tanks I saw outside the MosSoviet building earlier. A peaceful looking soldier suddenly aimed his assault rifle at the crowd and released the safety catch, although the crowd made no move to siege his camouflage-painted airborne tank. What was there that the soldier suddenly dreamed of? What did he feel outside the Moscow city Soviet building wearing a battle helmet and aiming his gun at unarmed people? The great idiocy brought him there heavily armed as if for a battle, and only a fleeting moment separated the world from another Tbilisi-like tragedy.

I saw it myself.



Much is being written about the servicemen who keep their fingers on the red "launch" buttons of nuclear missiles. But at times the trigger of an assault rifle in the hands of an army private can become the catalyst of a world tragedy. Any authority that is the first to deploy tanks in a big modern city is criminal. It is not really clear whether the soldier with the gun is to blame, but there is no doubt that the soldiers' commanders are guilty. The higher their ranks, the greater the responsiblity.

...What's this? Similar tanks inside the barricade ring around the White House, and similar soldiers on them – poorly fed children of the Brezhnev era – they answered questions as gloomily, and they carried the same guns, but they were "ours."

We gave apples and tomatoes to a big guy wearing a stripe with the inscription "Russia" on his forehead. He was very grateful and asked whether we had any bread.

The Moscow city Soviet and the municipality of Moscow should have been more considerate of their defenders.

I asked why those tanks were "ours" – were they following orders? Did the tankmen voluntarily change sides?

"There is only one order now for all Russia. And there is also our conscience. Soldiers are here on the orders of conscience," explained a young man with a piece of cloth tied around his forehead.

At that moment a man with a bullhorn announced from atop a tank:

"Officers've come here to try and scare the soldiers who are on our side! They must not be allowed to come near the soldiers, but they are not to be hurt! No provocations!"

A colonel of the armour, a bespectacled and intelligent looking man of advanced age was calmly awaiting his lot. The crowd could tear him to pieces. The man with the bullhorn talked the crowd into forming a human corridor and letting the colonel out. The colonel was reluctant to leave. Thousands of lives could have been sacrificed because of that unfortunate colonel. But the provocation failed, the colonel was escorted out, everybody calmed down, and we went around the building. It was about one in the morning. Thousands of people surrounded the Russian parliament building. At the end of the twentieth century the barricades were not much different from their 1905 prototypes: logs, boards, iron beds, steel rods, a heap of cracked bricks – the weapon of democracy. Young people all around. Many of them are sleeping, with their heads on their knees, waiting for the first sign of danger. There are many people, whose hair is already turning grey.

It's our side!

Someone has told me that there was an unprecedented influx of patients in the privileged hospital for the Kremlin elite. Some of the patients had to be accommodated in the corridors for lack of space. They wanted to be elsewhere when the putschists took over – although many of them must have been informed in advance about the putschists' plans.

They were afraid.

Now I know who our people are. They are the people who are not afraid of the putsch.

Simon Soloveichik

The West's reaction

Our own correspondent in Tokyo reports that the Tokyo Stock Exchange was the first to react to the news of a crisis in Moscow. The stocks and the Japanese yen sunk against the dollar, and the price of gold started climbing up, as it often does during global crises.

Later, Prime Minister Kaifu convened an extraordinary session of the National Security Council of Japan and told journalists: "We express hope that the policy of perestroika and the diplomacy of new political thinking, which used to be pursued by President Gorbachev will continue." A special agency of the Japanese government is working around the clock gathering and processing information from the Soviet Union.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry believes that the removal of President Gorbachev can have serious consequences for international peace and stability at a time when

a new world order is taking shape. The new Soviet regime is regarded as a group of hard-liners. The absence of Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh in the State Emergency Committee may indicate the possibility of changes in Soviet foreign policy, in particular, it may affect the relations with Japan and hinder the signing of the Soviet-Japanese peace treaty.

Premier Kaifu had a fifteen-minute phone conversation with President George Bush. Both leaders agreed that the change of power in the Soviet Union had no constitutional authority behind it and expressed the firm hope for continued perestroika policies.

"It is impossible to imagine that Yeltsin, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Afanasyev, Popov, Sobchak and other reformers would sit idle and bow to the coup," said Hiroshi Kimura, Japan's most prominent Sovietologist, professor at the University of Hokkaido. "That is why one can expect resistance in the form of strikes, demonstrations, a general strike and sit-in strikes. Unfortunately, I foresee a rather gloomy future for the Soviet Union," Kimura said. "So far, being in the political centre, Gorbachev has served as a buffer between the reformers and the conservatives. Now that the buffer is gone, these two forces will be in for a head-on collision.

Japanese businessmen will be reluctant to make any deals with the USSR if it is plunged into unrest and chaos."

The general mood in the United Kingdom is best described as a mixture of surprise and anxiety, our correspondent reports from London.

The British government called the news from the Soviet Union "a bolt from the blue" and characterized the situation as "very alarming." M. Linda Chalker, the acting Foreign Secretary during Mr. Douglas Hurd's vacation, called the information from Moscow very serious and very threatening. Mr. Hurd himself said the news was alarming and added that some time would be needed to adequately assess the developments.

The opposition camp is gripped with anxiety as well. The Labour leader Neil Kinnock, who is also on vacation, called the events in the Soviet Union extremely alarming and noted that the West needed time to assess the developments. He added, though, that the USSR's prospects looked grim to him.

The Liberal Democratic leader warned against hasty conclusions, but suggested that eventually the Soviet Union might become a big Yugoslavia and that Europe had to think about some kind of collective action. He said the cold war might resume.

Hardly anyone in the West expected such developments in the USSR, Wulf Lapins, a Soviet problems expert for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, told our correspondent in Bonn. Gorbachev had been toying with the concept of perestroika for much too long without radically changing the system. The West understood perestroika as a process that would result in changes in the system in the USSR. What happened in the Soviet Union showed that the Soviet Union did not have real democracy, real democrats, or the real civil society which is impossible without a free market. The new leadership is composed of people who would have lost everything as a result of changes in the system – after the signing of the Union Treaty and the Yeltsin departification decree.

Another mistake of the West is its overestimating Gorbachev's ability to emerge unscathed from any trouble. According to the expert, the West was too focussed on Gorbachev's foreign political moves and overlooked his domestic policies. Hence the Western underestimation of warnings issued by Shevardnadze and Yakovlev. Several days before his death Sakharov also warned about the danger of what has just happened. The January events in Lithuania demonstrated that the West satisfied itself with Gorbachev's statement issued several days after the Vilnius bloodshed. The West should have sent a clear and energetic signal: what happened in the Baltics was not an internal affair of the USSR, but a concern of all of Europe.

Obviously, the putschists hope that the West's reaction will be what it was after the Beijing events two years ago. It is very cynical, but economic deals must be profitable no matter what kind of regime is in power.

Now bloodshed seems unavoidable. I do not think the new leadership will stop short of using force against its people. In this situation, Lapins said, my hopes rest on a general strike. It will show the real balance of forces in society. It is also important how the army behaves: many servicemen gravitate towards Alexander Rutskoy's position. As for the foreign political course, I think that the new leadership will try and preserve the old line.

I cannot say what the new people in Moscow are banking on: they have no concept of how to pull the nation out of its crisis. The Soviet Union will not make it without western help.

Vladimir Ovsyannikov (Tokyo)
Sergei Babusenko (London)
Dmitry Pogorzhelsky (Bonn)

The main character in *One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest* whom Jack Nicholson so brilliantly acts, sacrificing himself to extricate his bretheren in misery from the madhouse, declares after one lost fight that, "At least I tried." Alexander Yakovlov, the ex-head of Agitprop under Brezhnev ans Suslov, the former "exiled" Ambassador to Canada, ex-member of the Political Bureau and ex-secretary of the Central Committee for ideology, when perestroika began, ex-member of the Presidential Council, former senior advisor to the President, and now an ex-member of the CPSU, may also say that, "At least I tried."

The Central Committee's conflict with Yakovlev would be tragic if it were not simply ridiculous. The pig-headed obstinacy with which our righteous party exorcized, as if it were the devil himself one of those few men possessing wisdom, conscience, and honour indubitably shows this party's true face better than the incantations of its paid 'wise men' can, than all five recorded versions of its new programme with which it sought to tell the country and world that it was changing. It is not changing, all the changes are skindeep, born out of agony, merely a timeserving expedient to curry favour with the reformer-chiefs, who as chiefs merited obedient genuflection but who as reformers deserved to be drawn and quartered.

Why did Yakovlev fall out of favour with his opponents?

But stay, what opponents indeed? That is a term from a different vocabulary, from a different frame of mind. Opponents implies the right to take this or that stand, and spells conditions for a normal debate, the priority of truth or at least the presence of logic. But has our "own dear" Communist Party ever shown that? Can anyone ever recall such an instance?! It was denunciation and castigation instead of argument and decisions from the top instance that were substituted for the supreme truth.

Yakovlev was blamed for the ignominous 1939 Soviet-German Pact as if he had himself signed it, as well as for those secret protocols in line with which two empire-craving tigers, of which one, alas, was the Soviet Union, mangled and divided Europe. Yakovlev indeed demonstrated that we, too, should at long last acknowledge what the whole world knows. It was this that made the empire-craving jingoists hate him more than they hated Molotov and Ribbentrop taken together.

After that "fatal blunder," "we lost the Baltics," contend those aggressive right-wingers ranging from Alksnis to Ak-

Glasnost – a crime

The pig-headed obstinacy with which our righteous party exorcized as if it were the devil himself one of those few men possessing wisdom, conscience, and honour indubitably shows this party's true face better than the incantations of its paid "wise men" can

Alexander Pumpyansky

hromeyev, provided we do not go beyond the first letter of the alphabet. As if were Moscow to continue to din into every ear that it had no inkling of any protocols save the "protocols of the Zion elders," the grateful Baltics would still be "ours."

A most apt instance. Our historical materialists regard as important not the facts, but what is written about them in resolutions and short courses. "The party's word" looms above reality. The policies of a great power may be built up from words alone, rejecting out of hand all unwanted realities as nonexistent, and unimportant.

Yet the aforementioned Pact and the Baltics are but one sidelight. Yakovlev's main crime is the policy of Glasnost. Prior to Glasnost we had but one party, iron rule and the *Pravda;* which means truth, and only the *Pravda,* which means truth. But just look what we have now.

I am inclined to agree. Political plurality, a multiparty system and an embryonic civil society are all offspring of Glasnost. Only six years have elapsed since people were allowed to speak out and hence think and write about what they thought, but nothing has remained of the old times. Surely, we must stigmatize the "architect by the ruins," heap the fragments of socialism on his head and throw the cornerstones at him.

Perestroika's sponsors demonstrated an astonishing light-mindedness. When they initiated perestroika, they had no finalized scheme of things. Perestroika was conceived as a means of improving socialism, but in the upshot not a stone is left of the fortress walls of socialism. Such are the main accusations. How come that in five years alone, the edifice it took seven decades to build was demolished?

The Number One mine is undoubtedly the "new thinking," with "thinking" the key word here. It is new, of course, exclusively for us, not for the rest of the world, as our society was taught not to think, since it was maintained that our leaders, both dead and living, had long thought out everything for us. Incidentally, Yakovlev said the same, only in a still more explicit and simple manner. Perestroika implied the return of common sense plus the reinstatement of morality which was the first victim of Party purges and state ordered repressions. Now but one step was needed to acknowledge the priority of human values over "class" values.

Common sense. Morality. The priority of general human values. How simple. But a mere six years ago these simple, obvious truths, were taboo. Naturally, because as soon as they were let out of the bottle, the mainstays of the system collapsed, insofar as it had held exclusively on the permafrost of falsehood, clublaw, and violence.

For that crime they cannot forgive Yakovlev.

Were Yakovlev a thief in the night, a raper, a murderer, the most that could threaten him considering his age and war wounds, would be a prison sentence. However he is shown no mercy. One brasshat bully, whose peacetime military career was meteoric, even dared to slander Yakovlev's wartime youth, and did not even subsequently think to shoot himself to atone for this dishonour. This peasant boy from a rural region outside Yaroslavl, who has retained something of that characteristic accent despite his Columbia University stint was declared a Jew. No decent society would understand that. But for the secret tribunal condemning Yakovlev to this gossip that is the supreme penalty.

Some omnipotence! With us everything belongs to the party, if not the CPSU then the party of jingoists, which includes not only the country's future, but also people's pasts, their names even the bloodlines of long deceased parents.

The decades of omnipotence have done the CPSU a disservice, causing it to lose every ability to look at itself from the sidelines as it were, to act rationally. All that is left is pure instinct, reaction. Apparently it does not realize what it has lost, by parting with Yakovlev, and still earlier, with Rutskoi, Shevardnadze, Yeltsin, Popov, Sobchak and another four million of its members.

But is it that we don't get the full picture? Could it be the party itself that has thereby triggered the process? Moreover beginning, which is but natural, with itself...

THE MIDDLE EAST

Stitching together the pieces

The year of the USA's highest activity in the Middle East in history began with a war. But it may end with peace. The long-standing enemies – the Arabs and the Israelis – are getting ready for a peace conference

No matter what the result of the coming peace conference on the Middle East in October, 1991, will go down in the history of the United States as a year of high activity in this region of chronic unrest. No matter how, the "patriots" of all colours curse the US imperialism, the energetic actions of the Americans in defending Kuwait probably saved mankind from mass destruction. Of course, the Iraqi leader should also be thanked: if it hadn't been for his rash action, the world wouldn't have guessed that Iraq was preparing a wide-scale nuclear war, after which there would have been only memories of Israel and Palestine, and then of Iraq and many other countries in the region. The Russian proverb is right, though: "There's no bad without good."

And now, as was promised during the last war, the problem would try to be settled by peaceful regulation. According to the American plan which is supported by the Soviet Union, the problem would be solved in two stages: reconciliation of the Israelis with their Arab neighbours, and then solving of the Palestinian problem. I left out one word on purpose in the last phrase – "just." But I'll come back to that later.

The Secretary of State of the USA, James Baker, made six trips to the Middle East trying to get Syria and Israel meet each other half-way. Syria, part of whose territory is occupied by the Israelis (11,000 Jews live there now) took a more constructive position than Tel Aviv. President Hafez Assad said President George Bush's proposal was a promising basis for peaceful settlement in the area. There was no anti-imperialist rhetoric.

But Israel was another matter. It insisted on provisoes which could make the second part of the American plan impossible: exclude the PLO and the representatives of the Arab section of Jerusalem (the eastern part), for Jerusalem is the indivisible capital of Israel. Besides, the prime minister of Israel, Itzhak Shamir, rejected the principle of peace in exchange for territory.

In his effort to resolve the problem, the US State Secretary made a mistake and gave contradictory promises to both of the conflicting sides. It turned out that on the 7th of August after meeting with Baker, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs David Levy in Jerusalem and the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Amr Moussa in Cairo made opposite statements on forming a Palestinian delegation. Both referred to an agreement with Baker in doing so. But we won't judge the Secretary of State too harshly, after all he had good intentions and he was working under a lot of pressure.

Arab neighbours

At the coming peace conference the ministers of foreign affairs, there must be representatives of the European Community, a representative from the UN, a Palestinian delegation, Israel and its Arab neighbours, the USSR and the USA.

In regard to such a neighbour of Israel as Egypt there's no problem: it already has diplomatic ties with Israel, and they get along peacefully. Jordan, having ruined its reputation a bit when it supported the aggression of Saddam Hussein, has again taken a reasonable position and is ready to attend the conference in a mixed Jordan-Palestine delegation. Syria has already agreed to take part in the negotiations with Israel, which could lead to another Camp David – returning the Golan Heights to it in exchange for peace and diplomatic ties.

The position of Lebanon, which Israel has snipped off a safety zone from in the south of the country, is curious. It seemed the question of the occupation of Lebanon's south should be on the agenda. Instead, the leader of the republic said that was a domestic matter.

It could be, because Beirut is convinced that if the country can get its internal affairs in order and if it succeeds in placating the non-Lebanese groups which are conducting a partisan war against Israel in the south of the country, Tel Aviv will agree to a third Camp David and give back the safety zone.

But for now, in spite of the fact that the 16-year civil war is over, there is still unrest in Lebanon, and as before extremist groups of all colours hold sway – in the name of Islam or in the name of the revolution. The capital is carefully combed by the security forces and Syrian soldiers searching for missing people and hostages of these groups. Today more sensations over hostages come out of Lebanon than any other country of the Middle East. The key to solving this problem is mostly in the hands of Israel, strange as it may seem. There are quite a few Palestinians in Israeli prisons, and in the occupied south of Lebanon about 400 Palestinians and Lebanese have been put in prison for terrorism and acts of aggression. In 1989, the Israelis prudently nabbed one of the leaders of the Hezbollah terrorist pro-Iranian group, Kerim Obeid. Now he has become a trump, a valuable bargaining chip. Great Britain asked the Israelis to free him in exchange for freeing the European hostages. President Bush made a similar request. However, Israel first wants assurances that seven of its soldiers who have been missing in Lebanon since the 1980s are still



The way the PLO sees the Palestinian delegation at the coming peace conference

Caricature from the magazine Democratic Palestine (PLO)

alive. After that an exchange is possible and the problem of hostages as it stands now may be removed. Evidently, it will only be finally solved when the government is stronger in Lebanon and the terrorist groups are stamped out.

Who are the Palestinians?

The leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, called the plan for holding a peace conference an American-Israeli plot to usurp Palestinian rights. He questioned the legality of the conference, since it was to be an international and not a regional one. The Palestinian leader stressed that only the PLO truly represented the Arab people of Palestine and the millions of Palestinians and tens of millions of Arabs who sympathise with them.

Nevertheless, Israel's Arab neighbours are prepared to take part in the conference even if the PLO won't. And the PLO found itself in a very difficult position on account of its support for Saddam Hussein during the attack on Kuwait. Even Jordan apparently turned its back on it, though it was sympathetic to the Iraqi leader. The Jordanians agreed to send a Palestinian delegation even though the PLO won't participate. The PLO bases in Lebanon were disarmed and brought under the control of the government of the country, not without bloodshed.

Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, none of the Palestinians will begin negotiating with Israel without the permission of the PLO. And it hasn't given it. So who will represent the Palestinians at the conference in Washington? The most authoritative figure is the Palestinian Feisal al-Huseini, who lives in Eastern Jerusalem. The PLO has always respected him in spite of the fact that al-Huseini thinks Jerusalem shouldn't be an indivisible Arab capital, but the capital of Israel and Palestine at the same time. That Shamir does not want to allow any Palestinian from Eastern Jerusalem to take part evidently won't effect Feisal al-Huseini, since he recently bought a villa on the occupied West bank of the Jordan River. But it's early to speak about the fall of the PLO. Its authority among the Arab masses remains great, and if its representatives don't participate in the conference, it could mean that the Palestinian problem will be taken off the agenda, unless some miracle happens. Such a miracle might be a referendum on the occupied territories to determine if the majority of Palestinians see the PLO as their leader.

What about us?

The role of Moscow in the current situation could be viewed in two ways: our country lost out – the Americans squeezed us out of the Middle East; or thank God things are finally moving in the direction of peace there. The second variant is closer to me personally, as a normal Soviet citizen thinking more about how to make ends meet than about the interests of the world proletariat. It seems that a much more important question is how we can get back the billions of rubles given at one time to Iraq and Syria mainly by our military. And how to keep the military from such methods of strengthening friendship in the future.

I could be accused of a narrow-minded approach to serious political problems. Unfortunately, you can't escape it even if you look at the whole thing from the point of view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Our foreign policy, thank God, has gotten away from abstract and charitable actions. Now, when those very same developing Arab countries which we helped live a lot better than we do, the pragmatists are saying: what will we get out of it? It is to our advantage to be friends with the USA and the European countries, since they don't demand help from us, but try to give it. At the same time, we haven't in the least quarrelled with our Arab friends and haven't been driven out of the Middle East by the Americans. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Alexander Bessmertnykh, took part with Baker in the preparation for the Middle East conference. But the Soviet Union has yet to say its weighty word on the Palestinian problem.

It is another matter that the Palestinian problem won't be decided at the coming conference. But then, that is just a beginning. Let the participants at least make clear their positions, the reasons for the actions of the opposing sides and choices they have. But I think it shouldn't be forgotten that in the end the Palestinian problem is the main one, and until it is solved, there can be no peace in the Middle East.

Dmitry Zgersky

The state stuck to a diet, and the society recovered

"Government doesn't solve problems, it only creates them," asserted Ronald Reagan. The president has refuted himself. His government has led America out of the most severe post-war economic crisis and has unexpectedly inspired its countrymen with self-confidence

Yevgeny Rusakov,
New Times correspondent



It took America a long twenty-three years to cope with the "Vietnam syndrome," which was the manifestation of the deepest and gravest crisis of the society.

When the desk in the Oval Office in the White House was occupied by Ronald Reagan, the country was still half-stunned, and the enormous lines for gas in the summer of 1979, the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran by black-bearded Islamists, and our invasion of Afghanistan could not enhance optimism among Americans.

Will capitalism survive?

Those days this question was seriously asked not only by our triumphant ideologists, but by the most reputable American magazines, politicians, businessmen and scholars. "The Age of uncertainties" – this was the title then given to a series of broadcasts and a book by John Galbraith, an economist with a world-wide reputation.

In the economy of Western countries, periods of slow progress alternated with those of no progress at all, or at times it dropped precipitously, and all these convulsions took place against the background of galloping inflation with its paralyzing effects. For the first time in post-war America the yearly price increases exceeded 11-13 percent, and the growth of labour productivity and renovation of technology sharply slowed.

"Never before in our history have the Americans had to face three serious dangers threatening our existence, each of them being able to ruin us. We see a collapsing economy, a weakened defence, and an energy policy based on a total shortage of fuel and energy resources," Reagan used to say in those days. And he declared in his inauguration speech: "...The United States is facing the gravest economic problems. We are living through the longest period of inflation in our history which holds on an unprecedentedly high level; it disrupts our decisions in economics and undermines our welfare. It threatens the well-being of millions of people..."

"When a high rate of inflation strikes so immense an economy as that of America, it always arouses fear," says Peter Bakstansky, the vice-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, speaking about those years. The study of this lean friendly person, who explained with readiness the intricacies of financial policy, after the fashion of the last century, is situated on the thirteenth floor of the massive grey bank where Boris Yeltsin recently spent six hours, talking with financiers. "The consequences of inflation in the USA exert a disastrous influence throughout the entire world because the national currency of many countries is based on the dollar."

Whatever the differences between the Soviet economy and that of Western countries, there are many common features between the malady that struck Britain and the USA in the '70s and our present crisis – the economic laws cannot be cancelled by writings on the "advantages of the socialist mode of production." There is, of course, a differ-

ence, but not to our advantage: when a total state monopoly is combined with years-long hidden inflation, the vicious spiral of stagflation – when inflation accelerates the production slump and thus intensifies the price hikes – becomes an increasingly paralysing factor.

The American and British experience shows that without the "shock therapy" resorted to before the "Balcerowicz plan" was enacted, without hard measures to stabilize finances, without a production slump and growth of unemployment it is impossible to break the spiral of stagflation. Added to it is the necessity of our country to start the mechanism of market economy at the same time. In this situation a complete collapse of the economy may be avoided only by means of well coordinated activities in all directions, including the use of certain methods, attested in the West, of overcoming slump coupled with a galloping price hike.

Even the Americans had to solve the problem of stimulating labour and business. The assertion that the cause of the American economic semi-paralysis in the '70s was centralized planning may seem ridiculous not only to us, but also to the Swedes or the French. But, apparently, every country has its own limits determined by the character, traditions and history of the society. In America's case, a comparatively insignificant amount of interference by the state in their business initiative and labour stimuli proved to be suffocating, because the majority of Americans are not used to getting anything from the government except general stability, – or a sheriff and firemen on the local level. Unlike our own anonymous and omnipotent "Benefactor"-state hidden by a haze of mystery, an American citizen knows exactly how much and on which "benefits" of the state he spends from his own pocket, whereas the military expenditures were considered an unavoidable payment for the security of the country and its leadership in world affairs, the swelling of social programmes aroused increasing irritation as a forcible levelling, an encouragement of a psychology of dependence and undermining of the American principle "the concern for the wellbeing of every individual is in his own hands."

At a certain stage the increasing state functions upset the balance inherent in American society, the medicine began turning to poison, and the country could not recover without restoring the balance.

Reagan's words that "those who work don't have adequate remuneration for their labour because the existing system of taxation doesn't stimulate the will for success and raising the productivity of labour"

evoked a ready response in the hearts of Americans.

"Perestroika" Reagan-style

What was happening in the economy of the United States as well as in that of other countries in the XXth century fits well in Hegel's triad and the Marxist version of the law of negation of negation. During the entire last century and almost three decades of the current one, the country has lived in the spirit of enterprise free from state surveillance, of "sturdy individualism" and belief in Adam Smith and the "invisible hand" of the market. The first thing Reagan did in the White House was to hang on the wall the portrait of his favourite predecessor Calvin Coolidge, who, in his State of the Union address in 1926 declared: "The essence of our government system consists in that it is founded on the principles of freedom and independence of individuals... What has been saved up by individual efforts should not become the source of state wastefulness."

Unfortunately, as the proverb has it, "what is too much is hazardous to the health." The American model of indusitrial development carried to an extreme fell victim to the glorification of the total spontaneity of the market, just as our economy fell victim to the opposite extreme – unlimited state centralization. This was followed by infarction of the system, the Great Depression and Roosevelt's great turn to a regulated market economy and conversion of the state from a "night guardian" to an accelerator of economic and social development. By the end of the 1970s the Americans came to the conclusion that they had travelled too far along this path.

"The Reagan revolution" has brought about the greatest turn for almost half a century in the country's internal policy. Now the state has been ordered to stick to a diet – to reduce taxation, regulation of economic activity, and expences, to reduce social programmes instead of developing them as was the case during the previous years, and most importantly, to cease all attempts to govern the economy, relying on entrepreneurs' and workers' energy.

Willy-nilly Reagan sometimes went too far in his economic, social, and military policy, though more often in rhetoric than in practice. Frankly speaking, I find it difficult to decide whether the orgy of embezzlement of state property, exchange speculations, and getting rich by illegal means were the inevitable side effects of the President's turn in the society's economic ways

and a price paid for the revival of a dynamic economy, or whether all this might have been avoided. It's well known today that the economic programme of the Reagan administration itself was far from perfection and integrity, and the deficit of the federal budget increased three-fold instead of diminishing, thus destroying all hope for a growth of savings of Americans as a result of reduction of taxes. Even in the monetary policy, as it turned out, it suffered from the consequences of the universally criticized policies of the Carter administration, to be more exact, of Paul Volker whom he had appointed Chairman of the Council of managers f the FRB.

"The key day in the history of the Federal Reserve system was October 6, 1979, when the decision to change its policy was reached," says Peter Bakstansky. "The functions of the Central Bank – which in the USA is a synonym for FRB – includes regulation of the money circulation by means of increasing or decreasing the reserves, first of all by buying or selling government bonds. Credit becomes cheaper or more expensive accordingly. Before the October decision the FRB had established the level of the bank discount rate and thus encouraged inflation instead of checking it. This happened because when the inflation psychology dominates, the employees demand a salary raise in advance, while the entrepreneurs calculate the prices of commodities proceeding from the expected growth of production costs – the higher prices for labour power and raw materials, – thus creating a vicious circle. Beginning in October 1979, the FRB established only the volume of the reserves, leaving the discount rate to be formed in natural way. It meant essentially that not everyone would have all the money they had expected to receive. The resolute implementation of this policy brought about a serious economic slump, but the inflation psychology was removed. In the autumn of 1982, there began the longest boom in US peacetime history, which continued until last autumn.

What, then, was Reagan's personal merit? It was that he, with the help of his rather contradictory economic programme, promoted both the rigid monetarist policy and the growth of production, while in some respects he hindered both. During the most severe postwar economic crisis of 1981-1982 the President stoically endured all criticism and didn't deviate from his programme, whatever its seemingly obvious shortcomings.

The fact that psychology influences the economy and vice-versa is common knowledge in America, and few may compare with Reagan in the art of inspiring self-confidence in his countrymen.

"We are not doomed, as some seem to believe, to an inevitable slump," he said in his inauguration speech. "I don't believe in a fate which is to befall us regardless of our efforts. I believe that this may happen only if we sit and do nothing. So let us use our creative energy to initiate a new era of national revival. Let us revive our purposefulness, our courage and strength. Let us revive our faith and our hopes."

However messianically provincial the cliches incessently repeated by Reagan may seem (and rightly so), such as "we believe in our mission," "the United States remains the last real hope of mankind" – they struck a chord in the hearts of Americans brought up by centuries of belief in their motherland. As early as May 1982, one of the most serious researchers of American society, Cristofer Lasch, wrote, "The outstanding features of American cultural and personal life today is fear of disintegration of the self. This has produced a survival mentality. So many pressures are beating on people – economic deterioration, an escalating arms race – that they are desperately trying to just survive the general wreckage." But already in slightly over one year's time the Americans looked to the future with an optimism impossible a decade and a half ago; the main reason for the optimistic mood was, no doubt, the turn for the better in economics; but everything is so interdependent...

Everything is good which is not too much

When Reagan declared that America had revived, he was close to the truth. But the "perestroika" was to be paid for dearly, and not only by the orgy of individualism.

The dark side of the reduced taxation under Reagan was that it was not coupled with a corresponding reduction of state expenditures, which led to the tremendous growth of the deficit of the federal budget," asserts Peter Bakstansky. "Generally, there is nothing good if the monetarist and other directions of financial policy go in different directions. As for the state debt, which is financed from the savings of the American citizens and foreign deposits, it implies a corresponding reduction of possibilities for businessmen to take credits for updating technology or for building a house for one's family. Credit becomes more expensive, so does the money, and the danger of inflation psychology reappears."

"Is it possible to say that in this sense the present slump has a positive effect?" – I asked.

"Well, it is, of course, incorrect to say that unemployment is good," said my interlocutor, emphasizing his status as an official spokesman.

"And from a purely pragmatic position?"

"Probably, yes. A slump suppresses inflation and creates a new basis for the economy on which it may grow. The most important thing in financial policy is a reasonable combination of different methods and approaches which might guarantee economic growth and a high level of employment coupled with relatively stable prices."

Such is the ideal not always attainable even in America. Yet from the point of view of long-term tendencies, today the country seems to be in rather good condition. The slump has really cooled down the overheated economy; in the meantime there increasingly appear symptoms of its nearing an end, and there is in it George Bush's merit, too. Although he came to the White House as "Regan's devouted comrade-in-arms and the continuer of his cause," it was immediately noted here that the new president had introduced every important corrections into the new administration's philosophy. Unlike his predecessor's motto that "government creates problems instead of solving them," in his inauguration speech Bush emphasized the priority of social interests over individual ones. He called on the nation not to be limited by purely material incentives: "My friends, we are not the sum of our possessions,... we cannot hope only to leave our children a bigger car, a higher bank account. We must hope to give them a citizen of what it means to be a loyal friend, a loving parent, a citizen who leaves his home, his neighbourhood and towns better than he found it."

Nor had the new Administration time to be elated by its victory in the elections. All the best that Reagan had managed to accomplish he took along into history, and all the worst – the enormous state debt, the pauperization of the poorest, the bankruptcy of the credit and savings system which may cost the tax payers half a trillion dollars, demoralization of civil functionaries in Washington – buying up of America by Japanese – had, naturally, remained. Paraphrasing the well-known dictum by Voltaire's *Candide*, one may say that, alas, there is nothing perfect in this best of all possible worlds. A great potential and will to power are needed to overcome new problems and meet net challenges. America and the Americans have them.

NEW YORK

Bulgaria, our friend

"The Bulgarians mourned the death of Tsar Boris and mourned the death of Georgi Dimitrov as well," said one of my interlocutors in Sofia.

Those who only recently proclaimed in all sincerity: "With the Soviet Union forever!" now repeat as enthusiastically, "Long live the United States!"

Anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments seemed unthinkable in Bulgaria. Today they are widely discussed by the public and in the press. The Bulgarian opposition is considered the source of anti-Sovietism.

Allergic to Socialism

One day I had an appointment with Pyotr Dergliyev, member of the Bulgarian Parliament and leader of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party. In front of the Parliament building I saw a statue of Russian Tsar Alexander II whose Army had helped the Bulgarian people free themselves from the Ottoman yoke. The statue in downtown Sofia has miraculously survived even the Communist government.

"I have been engaged in politics since 1929," Pyotr Dergliyev told me. "I served my first term of imprisonment under Tsar Boris. After Soviet troops had driven the Germans away, Communists, Social Democrats, and the Agrarian Union formed a coalition. When Communists began laying their hands on the entire country by means of force, we opposed this. In 1946, then the Secretary of the Young Social Democratic League, I was arrested and sent to a prison camp. In 1948 the leaders of our party were arrested. One of the Party secretaries was tortured to death. The leader of our Party was smothered in prison. Many Social Democrats died in prison camps. I was discharged in 1957."

While Pyotr Dergliyev was telling his story, I thought that it was stupid to ask his opinion about the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of Georgi Dimitrov, which had carried out the Stalinist programme of reorganizing Bulgaria, ruined his life. But political leader Dergliyev was above the injustice done to him.

"The Bulgarians and the Russians have been neighbours since the earliest times, and this is at the root of our relations," Pyotr said. "We are going through a difficult period now. Bulgaria is getting rid of the remnants of Stalinism and of the unpleasant memories connected with Communist rule. Our party, too, is to a certain degree a victim of such a negative mental attitude. Unfortunately, the name of our Party repels many young people who are allergic to the very words 'socialist' or 'social'. Nevertheless, young people join our Party. The Social Democratic Party is in no way to blame for the developments in Bulgaria during the past 45 years, which have caused an allergy to socialism to spread all over the country now."

The Soviet Union acted imprudently when it looked for friends only among Communists, repelling all other people. Now Communists are considered guilty of all Bulgarian misfortunes. The same feelings exist towards the Soviet government, although today it is hard to say what was done in Bulgaria by the order of Stalin and his governor-generals, and what was local initiative.

A common joke widespread among those top Soviet officials who could freely go abroad on business any time, was: "A hen is not a flying bird, Bulgaria is not a foreign country." Every joke contains only a grain of humour, the rest being truth. After 1945 Soviet leaders were sure that they had the right to act in Bulgaria as they thought best. In 1947 Stalin was ready to remove Bulgaria from the political map of the world altogether, having included it into a Balkan Federation, side by side with Yugoslavia and Albania. Later on, Todor Zhivkov liked to talk about Bulgaria's joining the USSR as its sixteenth republic, well aware of the fact that the discussion of that subject was welcomed in Moscow. Zhivkov's colleagues in the Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party did not exclude that possibility. Only some technicalities were holding up the process.

From the Moscow Kremlin hill, Bulgaria may have seemed like a small country to be ruled over and put on the right road. The Bulgarians had a different opinion, though. Their silence could by no means be understood as consent.

He declined a ministerial post

Milan Drenchev, MP, spent 17 years in prison and prison camps. Unlike Social Democratic leader Pyotr Dergliyev, Milan does not bother about an allergy to socialism. He does not stand for either socialism or the Bulgarian Socialist Party which quite recently has been called Comunist. Milan Drenchev heads the Nikolai Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union, named after Nikolai Petkov whom Communists shot in 1947.

Bulgaria has two agrarian unions. One of them is called here official. Under the Communist government it existed as a show of socialist democracy and socialist pluralism. The other, headed by Milan Drenchev, was formed after the overthrow of Zhivkov. It is in opposition to Communists.

Milan Drenchev, with his grey moustache and fine head of hair, is an optimistic man, notwithstanding his 17-year term in prison camps.

With his two university degrees (Law and Economics), Milan worked after his discharge from a prison camp as a house painter.

Apparently he succeeded in that trade, too, be-

cause he was invited to paint the villa of Pyotr Mladenov, then a Politburo member. When Pyotr Mladenov became a short-term President, following the overthrow of Todor Zhivkov, he invited Milan Drenchev again. This time he offered the former house painter the office of a minister. Milan wisely rejected a portfolio in Mladenov's government.

Last spring everybody was surprised when Milan Drenchev said he wanted to go to Moscow as a member of a parliamentary delegation.

"'Why are you going to the Soviet Union?' my friends reproached me. And I told them: 'Mitterrand goes there, and Thatcher goes there. Why can't Drenchev go there? I must go by all means.' I do not consider either the Soviet Union or Russia, or the Russians guilty of my misfortunes. Your people have suffered from Communism more than anyone else. Bulgaria should not turn away from Russia. It is simply no good."

Should we put emotions aside and take a pragmatic approach?

As the leader of the Nikola Petkov Agrarian People's Union, Milan Drenchev wants most of all that former Communists be defeated in elections. But despite this, he cannot be regarded by anyone as anti-Soviet.

"Communists were loyal to Moscow and that exerted a harmful influence on our attitude towards Russia. For instance, Marshal Tolbukhin Avenue will be renamed, but not the streets named after the Russian generals who helped the Bulgarian people liberate themselves from the yoke of the Ottoman Empire," Milan Drenchev said in conclusion.

Politicians of the younger generation

What do some politicians of the younger generation think? Philip Dimitrov, Chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), is young and deliberately cool. I came to him at an inopportune moment, when it had just been broadcast that several parties and movements of the Union of Democratic Forces did not intend to obey Philip Dimitrov and would perhaps break away from the Union.

Black-bearded Philip, an ex-barrister and ex-psychiatrist, put three spoonfuls of sugar into a small cup of coffee, apparently to foster his intensive brain work. He told me that the opposition was not anti-Soviet.

"We do not want the former dependence on Moscow, though," he said. "Neither do we need the relations of allies. Security should be sought in a system of international guarantees, not in a military alliance. The preservation of a military alliance with Moscow will mean that we won't get rid of our former fear that Big Brother may at any time wish to come to the aid of his ideological brothers-in-arms again, at their request, of course, and in strict conformity with the military clauses of a treaty. We remember only too well how it happened in Czechoslovakia."

By some miracle, the statue of the Russian Tsar – liberator of Bulgaria – has been preserved in the centre of Sofia

Does the cold and indifferent tone of the Chairman of the UDF National Coordinating Council express the general opinion of the opposition?

While talking with me, Stefan Stoyanov, MP, was crossing out the words "Vice-Chairman of the Democratic Party" on his visiting cards.

"In a couple of days I shall be expelled," he said.

Stefan Stoyanov broke with the leadership of his party because he was against the extremism widespread in the midst of small opposition parties. The Union of Democratic Forces includes several parties with sound social bases and small organizations and movements, however, are an advantage to the opposition, because the principle "one party – one vote" is used at the sessions of the National Coordinating Council.

"Attacks on the Soviet Union are very popular at meetings today," Stoyanov noted. "It does not mean that anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. I am sure that subsequent relations between our countries will be good, but not as they used to be, in any case. I would say that now it is even necessary to take the pendulum a bit further so that it will move back to the normal position more quickly."

Stefan Stoyanov, a young nice and agile man in an excellently pressed suit, now and then went to a session hall to vote.

"After the disbandment of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the curtailing of bilateral trade and economic ties, our industry has found itself in difficulties," Stefan said. "Many people demand that a trade agreement be concluded with Moscow as soon as possible and that everything which Western countries do not take should be sold to the USSR. To try merely to re-enter the Soviet market now, however, means to choose an easy, but a wrong way. It is necessary to modernize economy, to raise its competitiveness, and to move towards the world market, not the poor Soviet one on which everything will be taken with gratitude."

A tall, long-legged girl was waiting for the young MP. She was trying hard to look serious, but he wanted to describe to me, a Soviet man, the attitude of Bulgarian people towards my country:

"Unity among the Slavonic people is everlasting, but relations among people should not influence interstate contacts. The political development of Europe leads us to normal relations with the Soviet Union, not to some special ones. Moreover, there are more than two Slavonic peoples. So, all of them should live in friendship, not merely the Bulgarians and the Russians."

Stefan Stoyanov took up politics quite recently. Before that he taught mathematics at a university.

"I chose mathematics," he said, "because I considered sciences a re-

fuge from Communism. I thought that I would never have to quote Marx and Engels. I was too naive, though. When I opened the Rules of the Union of Bulgarian Mathematicians, I learnt that my duty was to cling to the policy of the Bulgarian Communist Party in mathematics."

With whom do you side, brother Slavs?

A treaty of special relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union came to an end in August. Some people are glad, because the Bulgarian government thus repudiates a one-sided orientation on the government of the USSR and supports the reviving sovereignty of Bulgaria. Other people fear that there will be no one to protect Bulgaria from the danger of war. Whence such a danger? Turkey. The Bulgarians, just like the Armenians, entertain "special" feelings towards Turkey. And the memory of the Ottoman rule is not the whole point.

The problem of the Bulgarian Turks, whom Zhivkov tried to assimilate by force, has driven the Bulgarian public almost to the verge of hysterics. Many Bulgarians are sure that Turkey can invade their country at any time in order "to liberate and save" the Bulgarian Turks. Moreover, the Turkish government is now well aware of the fact that the Soviet Union will not stand up for small Bulgaria.

I had an occasion to talk with Professor Ivan Marazov, Deputy Minister of Culture. "Why did Zhivkov create the problem of the Bulgarian Turks in 1984?" I asked. "Didn't he realize that he was thus placing the very future of the Bulgarian people in jeopardy?"

"He simply wanted to turn the growing social discontent of the public against the Turks," he answered.

"Was it as simple as that?"

Ivan Marazov, a prominent scholar who lectures at European universities noted quietly:

"I don't think that politicians are too refined or scrupulous."

The Turkish problem was far from inevitable. Today, however, it has become a geostrategic factor. According to Radnyu Minchev, Chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army, Turkey's mighty military presence in the Thrace area worries the Bulgarians.

Military aspects are part of the problem, which includes two additional points. Whom does new Bulgaria side with? What will be its role or place in not-yet-united Europe from the Atlantic coast to the Urals?

Whom does new Bulgaria side with? The most primitive answer is: if it does not side with us, it goes against us. If Bulgaria does not renew the bilateral agreement and instead seeks understanding with NATO and the United States, should it be regarded as the one who has forgotten the long-standing friendship and has become the enemy of the USSR? No. Even the Bulgarian opposition forces do not want to quarrel with the Soviet Union, or with Russia. Even Socialists (Communists) note that special relations must not exist any longer.







The Russians liberated Bulgaria twice. The streets named after some generals of the old Russian Army will remain on the city map. Those which now bear the names of Soviet military leaders can be renamed, according to some statements of opposition forces

Photos by author

To those who regard the developments since 1985 as a disaster, the loss of a military ally in the Balkan area is intolerable. One thing should be specified in this context, however. The Bulgarian party apparatus, not the Bulgarian people, was the ally of the Kremlin officials. The Communist rule of 40 years has broken spiritual contacts between peoples and it is necessary to try to reestablish them now.

The Warsaw Treaty was little help to the common destiny of the Slavonic peoples. Bulgaria's regaining sovereignty and self-confidence as well as becoming part of a new Europe will help it establish proper relations with the Soviet Union, with Russia.

Resentment

There is some feeling of resentment in Moscow against Bulgaria. But the reason for a tiff is sought in the wrong places. The Bulgarian people have risen against their own Communists and their patrons, not against Russia or the Russians. To Bulgaria and Russia shaking off the past means renewing their friendship based on enduring ethnic and cultural contacts.

It is silly to resent the growing influence of Western countries in Bulgaria. This year, after all, Bulgarians have actually been barred from Soviet periodicals and books because of a decision of the Soviet government. One could subscribe to a Soviet newspaper or magazine if he was ready to pay in dollars. But Bulgarian people receive their payment in leva. Formerly Soviet publications were read all over Bulgaria. This spiritual contact has been broken through the fault of the Soviet government. In the course of this year Bulgarians have grown accustomed to reading other papers and other magazines, and Bulgarian sscientists and engineers now study monographs published in Western countries.

The House of Soviet Culture and Engineering in Sofia and the Bulgarian Culture and Information Centre in Moscow are having difficulties because both countries are short of money. Ekaterina Kishkina of the Bulgarian Ministry of Culture told me that those centres were needed today more than ever before to help maintain direct contacts between both nations who now meet as if after a prolonged separation. The premises of the Bulgarian cultural centre on Leningrad Avenue look tempting from the viewpoint of currency receipts. There is a rumour that the Moscow municipal authorities want to keep it for some companies.

In Plovdiv, I met my friend Georgi Razpopov, expert in Russian language and a first-rate translator from Russian. For several years now he has worked in the Bulgarian Centre in Moscow. He was in Plovdiv on his annual holiday. Georgi devoted two hours to me, showing me around Old Plovdiv. He spent half his life restoring those divinely beautiful streets. If the Bulgarian Centre is closed in Moscow, Georgi will come back home. There is still much to be done in Plovdiv. And what about us in the USSR? Shall we be left alone?

Leonid Mlechin
SOFIA–MOSCOW

Prague AUGUST

Josef Smrkovsky, one of the leaders of the Prague spring of 1968, recollects how the agelong friendship between two peoples was broken overnight.

His reminiscences have never been published in the Soviet Union and, to the best of my knowledge, they have not been published in Czecho-Slovakia either. In the early 1970s they appeared in a Prague samizdat publication. One of its copies has remained in my archives. Josef Smrkovsky was perhaps the most conspicuous figure of the Prague spring. He was a tall and lean man with cropped whitish hair and the sly open-hearted smile of a workman who knows his onions and has endured many trials.

Dubcek was the standard-bearer of the Prague spring. President Ludvik Svoboda was its conscience and Cisar its brain. Another member of the party leadership, Kriegel, embodied the irreconcilable character of the Prague spring and Cernik its flexibility. Josef Smrkovsky was undoubtedly its tribune.

Smrkovsky began his stuggle for the truth in the years of the first Czechoslovak Republic. In the early 1930s he was elected a secretary of the Red Trade Unions. After the Munich deal he went underground and took part in the Resistance Movement.

1968 Moscow

Smrkovsky represented the Communist Party in the leadership of the Prague uprising in May 1945. After the February 1948 events he, together with many others, was subjected to repression and was subsequently rehabilitated. In May 1968 he was elected chairman of the National Assembly (parliament) of Czechoslovakia. As a result of "normalization" in 1969, Smrkovsky was dismissed from all his posts and expelled from the Communist Party, and he died shortly thereafter.

Kira Nikiforova

...The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party began its meeting on Tuesday, August 20, 1968, at two p.m. We discussed preparations for the 14th Congress of the party. Until half past eleven that night none of us had the slightest idea of what dramatic events would soon take place.

At approximately half past eleven premier Cernik was invited to the telephone in the adjacent room. He returned in ten minutes utterly depressed, asked us to stop the discussion of preparations for the party congress, and announced that troops of five Warsaw Treaty states (except Romania) had crossed the state frontiers of Czechoslovakia in various parts and that our country would be occupied by six o'clock in the morning. His statement produced a terrible impression. Cernik himself fainted. The same happened to Dubcek. Both were immobilized. Then we started an absurd dispute which lasted for over an hour.

Time was running out, and we could not reach any decision.

One of the Presidium members – I do not remember who – suggested drawing up a statement, comrade Kriegel set about writing it and finally it was ready. I also took part in the drafting of the statement. But Kolder, Bilak, Jakes, and others dragged out our work with endless discussions. Dubcek was still in shock. He said that he should probably resign, but we did not agree with him. In view of the condition in which Dubcek and Cernik remained I stood up to say that the public was waiting for our announcement. It was necessary to end the discussion and vote since each of us spoke three or four times (Bilak and his friends objected to a passage saying that the armies of the Warsaw Treaty states have violated international law). Seven members voted for the statement and four against.

The President of the republic, Ludvik Svoboda, was sitting beside Dubcek. I had rung him up immediately after we received the news of the invasion. His wife told me that Svoboda was talking with Chervonenko (then Soviet ambassador to Prague) and that he would come after the talk. He arrived in an hour. I did not ask Svoboda whether he was for or against the publication of the statement, because the President was not a member of the Presidium...

We passed on the statement to the media. The radio announced: "We shall read out now a decision adopted by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party." And then the broadcast was cut short. Ten or fifteen minutes later I was called up on the phone in the adjacent room. Several employees of the radio (not central, but a district one, the radio of the Strahov district, if I am not mistaken) told me that they had been waiting for information from the Presidium, but Comrade Hoffmann said there would not be any information. I explained the situation to them, adding that Comrade Hoffmann had ceased to submit to us and refused to place the radio service at the disposal of the party's official leadership. This information was monitored in Vienna and within an hour or two the whole world learned about the decision of the party leadership.

One more episode took place at two or three o'clock at night. A delegation from the newspaper *Rude Pravo* came to the Central Committee office. The comrades told us that Svestka (editor-in-chief) ordered the presses that were printing the statement of the Presidium to be stopped. In addition, they said that he was writing a new statement. I informed the comrades of the real state of affairs. They did the best to get our statement published by *Rude Pravo*.

Some members of the Presidium and Central Committe secretaries left the meeting. Among them were Indra, Kolder, and Jakes. We were depressed by the events while they were running about to find out as early as possible what was going on. Cernik went to an urgently convened meeting of the government while Dubcek, Kriegel, Spacek, Slavik, and I decided to stay.

Some comrades came to us and expressed fears over our fate. "Why are you waiting for them to arrest you?" they asked us. "We shall give you shelter." I refused to leave the office and Dubcek did the same. We were waiting for the outcome. About five o'clock in the morning an automobile and then tanks drove up to the Central Committee building. Paratroopers surrounded it. Some of them, armed, rushed into the building. They were already accompanied by Czechs.

We were in Dubcek's office. They entered the room and announced that no one was allowed to leave the building. They also made a list of those present. Among them were our staff employees, such as my secretary, driver, and bodyguard, who had been waiting for us. All of us were put in Dubcek's office. If anyone wanted to go the WC he was accompanied by an armed paratrooper. We saw a senior officer drive up to the entrance of the Central Committee building. It was a colonel, a short man with two gold medals of Hero of the Soviet Union on his tunic. He wanted to know where Comrade Svestka was.

After five o'clock in the morning we saw large groups of young people gathering around the Central Committee building. Many of them carried national flags. They marched in a column, with ten people in a line, and a Czechoslovak flag was carried in front of the procession. The young people wanted to approach the building. All of a sudden, soldiers fired into the air while one of those who commanded them fired at a young man standing in the front line. I saw him crumple to the ground. Evidently he was killed.

On seeing the young man shot dead, I rushed to the telephone of Dubcek's secretary and said to her: "Connect me with Chervonenko, please." Chervonenko lifted the receiver right away. He was apparently sitting beside the telephone waiting for calls. I told the ambassador what had happened and warned him that he bore the chief responsibility for the bloodshed in the street. But I did not hear Chervonenko's reply because one of the paratroopers struck at the telephone with such force that it flew to bits. A few seconds later Dubcek called Cernik, who was in the government building. The cord was rather long. One of the soldiers cut it. Other soldiers then cut the other cords. They even out the cord of the direct line to Moscow.

Before midnight had I called my wife and told her what had happened. She did not believe me. I had no chance to speak to her later on. Later I learned that at seven o'clock in the morning on August 21, when we had already been arrested, a car stopped in front of my house in Stresovice and three or four persons went inside and tried to penetrate into our flat. They said that they had been sent by comrade Salgovic to ensure my security. Being a rather cautions woman, my wife refused to let them in. She responded: "Why was it necessary for Salgovic to send you when my husband has been detained? What are you going to do here?" They asked then whether they could make a call at least. My wife replied that they could just as easily do that from a coin-box telephone. Talking later with the wives of Cisar and Kriegel, she learned that the men went then to the flat of Cisar, arrested him and took him to the police department on Bartolomejska Street, and then they drove to Kriegel's flat.

...After eight o'clock in the morning the paratrooper commander, the already twice mentioned Hero of the Soviet Union, returned with Czech volunteers from the interior ministry and called out the names on his list. Then Dubcek, Spacek, Kriegel, I and others – I do not remember who – were told to follow him. We were led through the corridor to the office of Cestmir Cisar. When we entered the room an interior ministry official, who was closely watched by Soviet officers, announced that in two hours' time we would appear before a revolutionary tribunal presided over by Comrade Indra.

I could not help exclaiming: "What revolutionary tribunal and what Comrade

Who was Who

Some of the main figures involved in the 1968 tragedy have been almost forgotten today. So let us recall their names: **Karel Hoffmann**, then head of the Czechoslovak radio; **Oldrich Svestka** was editor-in-chief of the Communist Party's newspaper *Rude Pravo;* **Vaclav Slavik, Jozef Lenart** and **Zdenek Mlynar** were secretaries of the Communist Party's Central Committee; **Milos Jakes** was chairman of the Central Control and Auditing Commission; Prof. **Venek Silgan** was elected acting first secretary of the Central Committee at the 14th (special) congress of the party which was declared invalid; **Viliam Salgovic** was minister of the interior; **Bohuslav Kucera** was minister of justice, and **Martin Dzur** minister of defence.

Indra will preside over it?" Dubcek pulled my sleeve and said: "Josef, it's no use protesting. Don't say anything, keep silent." We were sitting in Cisar's office: we were on one side of the table and interior ministry officers were on the other. At around two o'clock we were ordered to follow them. At gunpoint we passed by Central Committee employees. Then we went downstairs. Where were they taking us? To the revolutionary tribunal or to the cellars? We were led out into the yard in which two armoured vehicles were standing. Dubcek and Kriegel were pushed into the back seat of one car and I found myself with Spacek in the other. We were taken to the Ruzyne airport. They placed us in a transport AN plane used for the delivery of tanks. In half an hour we changed to a military plane. Then the officers who accompanied us took Dubcek out and we did not see him again during the trip. He was apparently flown away on another plane together with Cernik. Three of us - Kriegel, Spacek, and I – remained in the plane. It was dark when we landed in Western Poland. We rode for about 15 kilometres and were placed in a police barrack camp. Each of us had his own guard. About three o'clock at night we were again taken to an airfield and placed in a TU plane.

We landed somewhere in the Carpathians. They took us in Volga cars in different directions. We rode for about 30 kilometres towards the mountains and stopped in front of a barrack-type camp and a small house in the yard surrounded by barbed wire. I approached the threshold of the house and saw Cernik standing there. It turned out that he had been brought several minutes before. Later we learned that the other comrades had been placed in a similar house 10 or 15 kilometres away.

For the first time after the arrest we could talk with each other. We sat down under a pine tree. Tears fell from the eyes of Cernik. Soon we were invited to the table and, unlike the previous day, we had quite a good dinner. There was even a bottle of wine on the table. We exchanged glances. "Oldrich," I said, "it's quite a different thing now. It means something, because such a dinner is served to decent people."

After the meal we went outside to get some fresh air. Suddenly an officer shouted to us: "Comrade Cernik, you are wanted on the phone." Oldrich went to the telephone and soon returned, agitated. "It was Sasha (Dubcek)," he told me. "Sasha talked with Brezhnev. He is going to Moscow and says that someone must go with him, so I'm going, too." This was on Thursday after dinner.

One of the posters issued in Prague in 1968

I remained alone the next day. Then a young man appeared unexpectedly and said: "We are flying out."

We landed at Vnukovo airport. From the airport we rode not straight to Moscow but turned right. Having ridden for about 40 kilometres through the forest, we found ourselves in front of a building surrounded by a blank wall. I was placed there. From the window of my room I saw Bohumil Simon in the yard. He had been brought here earlier.

We spent almost a full day together. The table was laid and we were invited to eat. I looked at the young woman who served us and asked: "We know each other, don't we?" She looked at me and said, "I don't know, I don't know." I told her that we met in June, when I was in Moscow with a parliamentary delegation. At a villa for guests, in which I stayed then, she served me together with another woman. I understood that the young women attending to foreign guests apparently worked for the KGB.

Two days later we went to Moscow. We were brought to the Central Committee building. We waited a little while on the fourth floor. Then we saw Josef Spacek, who was also lodged in the environs of Moscow. He stayed there with Kriegel. But the latter was not brought to Moscow.

When all three of us were together, a Soviet party worker invited us to follow him. The door to the conference room was opened and we saw Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny standing there. After greeting them we took our seats opposite them. Brezhnev was in the centre on his side, with Podgorny on the left and Kosygin on the right. I sat opposite him, with Simon on the right and Spacek on the left.

Brezhnev said a terrible thing had happened and they had come to help us. He spoke mainly about the 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. We learned from him that the 14th party

congress took place, that a strike was held in our country, and that the population was resisting everything. We also understood that a new government had not been formed and that Ludvik Svoboda was in Moscow along with other comrades. We learned that we would be taken to the Kremlin for negotiations and then we would return to Czechoslovakia. I then asked, "Does this mean that we are no longer under arrest and once again represent the Czechoslovak Republic?

Brezhnev kept asking what kind of man Silgan was. He and Kosygin told us that we must return home and annul the results of the 14th party congress in order to pursue communist policy. I noted in reply that we world return, of course, and that I would pursue communist policy in accordance with my conscience and the will of our people.

The Soviet leaders, especially Kosygin, got angry. The latter said: "How can you, a veteran Communist, say such things?" I replied: "I say what I think, precisely because I am a veteran Communist. I shall carry out policy with even greater diligence, in full accord with my conscience." We again exchanged several bitter phrases. In the end, Brezhnev got so excited that he began to address me as thee.

I told him: "You, comrade, have destroyed the agelong friendship between our peoples. For over 100 years now our people have been Slavophiles and have cherished love for Slav Russia, the Soviet Union during the past 50 years. You could have found the most loyal friends in our people, but all this was destroyed overnight."

Since no agreement could be reached we decided to suspend our talks. The guards respectfully greeted us as we left the Central Committee building. Then I unterstood that I was no longer captive and that I again had become chairman of the National Assembly. I was taken to a villa intended for government guests. We were given clean underware, as we had not changed ours for five days.

... In the Kremlin we were taken to the wing assigned to Ludvik Svoboda. When we entrered the building we saw 20 or perhaps 30 people there. Among them were Dzur, Kucera, Jakes, Lenart and many others whom I knew personally. Zdenek Mlynar and Cernik were also there. Dubcek was sick. We quickly exchanged the latest news. Then Mlynar informed us of the 14th party congress and the events in Czechoslovakia. It was from him that we learned most of the information. No one interfered with our conversation. However, Soviet officials were constantly among us.

We already knew from our comrades what the Soviet leaders expected of us. A protocol had to be drawn up. On reading the draft offered by the Soviet party, we declared that it was unacceptable to us and that we would draw up our own draft. We submitted such a draft. The delegation which I led and which also included Lenart and Svestka was entrusted with making the stand of our party known to the Soviet Politburo and Central Committee secretary Ponomaryov.

About 10 o'clock Sunday night we came to Ponomaryov and told him that we could not sign the Soviet draft protocol as it was unacceptable to us. Ponomaryov replied that our draft was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. I set forth the standpoint of our delegation, Lenart and Svestka did not utter a word.

Today I do not remember well the differences between the two drafts. The protocol signed in Moscow is known on the whole, but the first Soviet draft of it was much worse. It stated that troops were dispatched to Czecho-Slovakia in order to avert counterrevolution and to give internationalist aid to our country. We objected to this statement and it was then deleted from the text. Our opinion also prevailed on two other points. They concerned the troops stationed in Czecho-Slovakia. The first variant of the draft said that they would remain in our country. We conviced the Soviet leaders to accept the expression "temporary presence of troops" and insert a statement that the post-January policy and democratization would be continued. There were other, less important details. Nevertheless, we told Ponomaryov that we would not sign the draft unacceptable to us.

Ponomaryov replied: "If you do not sign it now you will sign it in a week. If you do not sign the draft in a week you will sign in two weeks, and if you do not sign it in two weeks you will do that in a month."

I told the other comrades about my conversation with Ponomaryov, and Lenart and Svestka confirmed its content. We had to accept the Soviet draft as the basis for negotiations. Subsequently we discussed precisely this text in order to introduce some miror amendments into it.

The comrades grouped round Dubcek concerned themselves with our own draft while other comrades, who arrived with Svoboda and also stayed in Moscow, were constantly away somewhere. I saw them very rarely. They probably exchanged information among themselves or Soviet comrades informed them about something.

Kriegel was brought to the Kremlin. However, instead of taking him to the government building they kept him in one of the rooms occupied by guards. Josef Spacek and I had to take protocol to him for signing. The Soviet leaders were interested in this, though Kriegel was not allowed to be present at the talks..

Kriegel quietly read the text and said that he would not sign it. Spacek and I told him what had happened, but he wouldn't change his mind, and he was still kept in the same police room. Someone – I do not remember who – asked that Kriegel be allowed to stay with us. We talked about this with Soviet officials and they gave their consent. Kriegel was brought to the room. He sat down, read the text once more and again said: "I will not sign it." He also explained why he refused to sign. A very unpleasant dispute arose between him and Svoboda. The President unexpectedly lashed out at Kriegel, spoke arrogantly to him as if he were a recruit. It was really terrible. Kriegel was an elderly man, he was 60 at the time. He asked Comrade Svoboda not to shout at him and then himself began to shout at Svoboda, speaking about the responsibility for the killing of many people at home. They did not come to an agreement.

...The last meeting between the Czechoslovak delegation and Soviet leaders was held in the evening. Dubcek was also present at the concluding talks. Before that he lay in the adjacent room and was under the constant observation of our doctors. Heart spasms did not cease. He felt very bad. As for a scar on his forehead, about which there was much speculation, it was the result of his fall in the bathroom when he fainted and struck his head against the washstand. The wound was dressed. Dubcek was looked after by our military doctors whom Ludvik Svoboda brought with him. Indra did not take part in the concluding talks either. Before the meeting a group of cameramen and reporters was let into the conference room. After they finished taking photographs and filming, the negotiations began. Brezhnev was the first to speak. Dubcek responded to him and then Cernik intervened. It seemed that the talks would break off.

Charges of various kinds were again brought against us. Dubcek dismissed them. It seemed that we would have to stand up and leave and the talks would

A street scene in August 1968

be discontinued. Ludvik Svoboda then took the floor. He said that a similar exchange of remarks was senseless, that it was necessary to take the protocol and discuss it point by point. He said that everything would be well again and that, when Soviet troops began to leave Czechoslovakia, people would see them off with flowers.

The Soviet representatives agreed with this proposal. It was Monday night. The talks ended about midnight with the signing of the protocol.

Before putting my signature I wanted to get legal advice. I asked our justice minister Kucera whether, in view of our condition, we had the right to sign protocols on behalf of the Czechoslovak state. Kucera could not give a definite answer. I asked him this question without any ulterior motive, simply because I wanted to know whether, under our Constitution and laws, I had the right to sign the protocol as chairman of the National Assembly. As was to be expected, in 1969, when I was removed from my post, this question was described as one of my mistakes. Piller raised the matter at a meeting of the Presidium (of the party's central committee), saying that I questioned the validity of our signatures already in Moscow. Finally, we signed the protocol.

It is difficult to say now who resisted the signing most of all or who strove to sign the protocol most of all. To one or another extent, all of us were against the signing. I understood that it was a decisive step, and I do not deny that I took it. But, as I said in my address on returning home, one fine day history will judge whether we acted correctly or committed treachery. I do not know. In those circumstances I acted of my own will, though I hesitated for a very long time.

...When the talks ended with the signing of the protocol, we had two or three hours before flying home. Breaking into groups of two or three we chatted with Soviet leaders. Lenart came up to me and said that comrades Ulbricht, Gomulka, Kadar, and Zhivkov were waiting in one the Kremlin halls. They wanted to greet us and have a drink with us. Lenart suggested that I gather "our" comrades, because not all delegates were invited. I looked at Lenart and said: "Comrade Lenart, go and tell them that we do not even want to see them let alone have a drink with them."

Most probably, Lenart conveyed my words to them. I told Dubcek and Cernik about my conversation with Lenart and they said that I had acted correctly. Up until my conversation with Lenart we did not even know that Ulbricht, Gomulka, Kadar, and Zhivkov were in Moscow. Only in this way did we learn that they took part in the Moscow talks and that the protocol and other documents had been drawn up with the participation of Ulbricht and his company*. And we, who knew nothing about this, were only invited to go and drink cognac with them...

We began to discuss our return to Czechoslovakia. Svoboda wanted to phone to Prague to ask the presidential office to make the necessary arrangements. The Soviet leaders objected, saying we should not worry about anything. Everything would be organized by the Soviet party, while in Prague all affairs would be dealt with by Soviet ambassador Chervonenko, they told us. The arrangements were made such that we arrived in Prague at night, and no one knew about it.

And so, breaking into small groups, we continued to chat with Soviet leaders. There was no Kriegel among us. Dubcek had told Brezhnev that all of us, Kriegel included, should return to Czechoslovakia. The Soviet side agreed.

After the signing of the protocol Dubcek came up to me and said that the Soviet side did not want to let Kriegel join us. I replied that it was impossible and that we must insist on new talks.

I invited Cernik, and he decided to talk with Svoboda, who at the moment was with Brezhnev in an another room. We obtained permission for a meeting and demanded holding "four four" talks. When it was necessary to settle some details, we gathered in groups of four on each side – Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and Suslov on the Soviet side, and Dubcek, Svoboda, Cernik, and I on the Czechoslovak side. We told the Soviet leaders that we would not return home without Kriegel.

They explained to us why they wanted to keep Kriegel in the Soviet Union. They said we would have difficulties at home because we signed the protocol while Kriegel would pose as a hero. We replied that it was our own business and that we would not go without him. Having consulted among themselves the Soviet leaders returned and said: "We shall return him to you." When we arrived at the airport, one of the Soviet comrades said: "Your Kriegel is in the plane." Then I called up a staff member of our embassy and asked him to go on board the airliner standing about 30 metres away from the airport building. He went there and returned, saying: "Everything is all right. Comrade Kriegel is on board the plane."

We flew home at night.

See on this subject the article "Murder will out" in our issue No.8/91.

The Marcos Gold

The hunt for the gold of the late Philipino dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, has been going on for five years already. The Corazon Aquino government accused the former president's family of having stolen about $ 10 billion and has begun criminal proceedings. The Marcos gold is hunted for by US attorney Ronald OLSON. Konstantin ISAKOV of *New Times* talks to Ronald Olson

We met in the Austrian castle of Leopoldskron near Salzburg where journalists from 26 countries assembled to attend the symposium "The Global Village and the Media Revolution" sponsored by the US Salzburg Seminar.

New Times. Why have you, an American attorney, volunteered to protect the interests of the Philipino government?

Ronald Olson. This was suggested to me several years ago by Jovito Salonga, President of the Philipino Senate.

Under the dictatorship, he was an active critic of the Marcos policy. The regime tried to kill Salonga, but he survived and had to emigrate. Like many other opponents of the regime, he found refuge in the United States where he taught law at Yale University. After the fall of the dictatorship, one of the first decrees of the Corazon Aquino government established a special commission in charge of finding and bringing back the treasures that the Marcos family had stolen from the people. Salonga was appointed chairman of that commission, he consulted many American experts looking for someone who would agree to investigate the case. My name must have been mentioned among others... That's how I was hired by the Philipino government. I report my work's progress to the Salonga commission.

Diamonds, pictures, banks

NT. What have you managed to achieve?

RO. The first task was to find out exactly how much the dictator had stolen. The exact sum remains unknown. According to some estimates, it runs into several billions of dollars and includes bank deposits and such valuables as pictures, gold, and jewels. The list of Mrs. Marcos' jewelry alone takes up about 25 pages. The money was invested in immovables as well, including land, buildings and banks. Before deciding how to return the stolen property to the nation it is necessary to find out where the treasures are hidden.

We believe that the property of the former dictator is scattered all over the world, but the bulk of it is kept in Swiss bank accounts under other people's names, of course. For some time we believed that billions of dollars were kept in those accounts and feared that Marcos would be able to hide those billions before we could start court action. However, we managed to get criminal proceedings started at a Los Angeles court very quickly. The judge prohibited Marcos from somehow manipulating his property while the trial was on...

Then the goal was to start criminal proceedings in a Swiss court, so as to identify the bank accounts.

NT. Switzerland has the reputation of a country which strictly observes the complete secrecy of bank accounts in its territory.

RO. Indeed, this iron rule has few exceptions, but we tried and took advantage of one such exception which binds bank executives to cooperate with representatives of foreign countries searching for capital in Swiss bank accounts which was obtained unlawfully. Thus, we were able to find the accounts with $ 300 million in them. There is reason to believe that Marcos also had other accounts which bank officials have so far been reluctant to reveal.

NT. Have you tried to return the immovable property belonging to the Marcos family?

RO. Marcos used the stolen money to buy companies in various countries. In particular, he purchased banks in Los Angeles and San Francisco and three administrative buildings on New York's Fifth Avenue. We were able to prove that the California Overseas Banks and a 40-storey skyscraper in New York are lawful property of the people of the Philippines.

The Marcos family also owns a lot of land. Marcos bought a Hollywood estate which is worth $ 5 million. We have managed to win this trial and to return the estate to its lawful owner, the people of the Philippines.

Marcos was well known as a devoted collector of pictures. Shortly before the revolution he tried to sell the pictures because it is easier to hide money. A family friend of the Marcos family, who had accumulated large capital mediating the selling of arms to the Middle East, Adnan Khashoggi, volunteered to help. It would have taken us a long time to find the pictures, had it not been for a tip from an Australian producer who was making a movie about Khashoggi. When he once visited Khashoggi's fashinable apartment in Cannes he saw there some of the pictures that used to be the pride of Marcos' presidential palace. We appealed to the French government and the Interpol and managed to return the pictures. Some time later we arranged an auction and the money earned from it was returned to the Philipino people.

Ronald Olson studied law at a college in Iowa, the University of Michigan, and Oxford University. Working for the US Department of Justice he supervised the federal government's desegregation programmes in southern states. He became widely known through trials in which he defended the rights of journalists. He also sued the US government for damages to the homeless and Indians for the confiscation of lands. Ronald Olson is a partner in the Munger, Tolles & Olson law firm in Los Angeles. He is also an enthusiastic tennis player.

Ferdinand Marcos: 20 years in power and reluctant to part with his treasures

Imelda Marcos: once one of the world's ten richest women, she is now the defendant in 35 civil cases

After the revolution in the Philippines, the dictator and his family escaped to Hawaii. I met his children – two daughters and a son – in San Francisco. After her husband's death, Imelda Marcos remained in Honolulu in an oceanside mansion. We are trying to return that mansion to the Philipino nation.

NT. You are drawing a rather attractive picture of the investigation. Was it really so simple?

RO. Unfortunately, the whole thing is not as simple as it may seem. We returned the dictator's property to the Philipino nation only in the cases when the Marcos family stopped resisting and surrendered. This was the case with the Hollywood estate, the Khashoggi pictures and the Los Angeles bank.

Now we are faced with a more difficult task – to get back the big investments in Swiss banks which continue to be registered for Marcos' dummies and the Marcos family's confidants. We need to prove that the money belongs to the people of the Philippines and to prove that it was stolen from the nation. We must confront the judge with convincing evidence that it is Marcos and the Marcos family who are responsible for the theft.

The hearings are due to begin in early March of next year. If we win the case and get the necessary permit from the Los Angeles court we will be able to appeal to the Swiss authorities asking them to give us an opportunity to return the remaining Marcos capitals to the people of the Philippines.

By the way, what do you think about this: suppose we reveal that some of the Marcos property is located in Moscow. Do you think we will be able to appeal to a Moscow court and ask it to display respect for the ruling of the American court and give us an opportunity to return, say a summer villa on a lake, to the Philipino nation?

NT. I do not think any Soviet court has ever dealt with such cases. The minimum that I can guarantee is the support of our magazine and the independent press...

RO. Journalists from various countries have assisted us by carrying out independent investigations.

The Olson team vs. the Marcos team

NT. Mr. Olson, you often use the word "we". Who helps you?

RO. I formed a team which at various times included 10 to 12 lawyers. Besides, we are using the services of about 15 legal advisors when it comes to issues of international law and laws of different countries. And we have hired several detectives and lawyers in Switzerland and France. It is difficult to say exactly how many assistants we have, but there must be about 100.

NT. Who are your opponents?

RO. The Marcos family has hired a number of lawyers in Switzerland, France, California, Hawaii, and the Philippines. "Friends" of the former dictator also assist the Marcos family.

At the very beginning of the investigation we were granted the right to examine the defendant under oath. However, both defendants – Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Imelda – resorted to the ammendment of the US Constitution that grants the defendant the right to remain silent. Silence was one of the forms of their resistance to justice.

NT. Have you or anyone in your team ever felt any pressure be on you on the part of the Marcos family?

RO. No one has ever threatened me and I have no information about any pressure brought to bear on my colleagues.

NT. In your opinion, how secure is the position of the Marcos family and their lawyers?

RO. They are vulnerable enough. I have no doubt that we will be able to prove the involvement of Ferdinand, Imelda, and their children and friends in the theft of the national property of the Philippines. They will try to prove they had earned all that money. However, we have their tax declarations which state, for example that their personal income in ten years did not exceed $ 300,000. I would love to ask them to account for the difference between the declared income and the actual capital.

NT. How did Marcos manage to get those billions?

RO. We know that Marcos appropriated 15 percent of the earnings from the selling of every pound of sugar – the main export item of the Philippines. We have evidence that Marcos appropriated the money paid to the Philippines by Japan as reparations for the WW damage, which was intended for the economic reconstruction of the country.

NT. How long do you think it will take before the case is completed.

RO. Marcos avoided drawing written documents about his financial affairs, I think that the search for evidence and witnesses will take up to 4 to 6 months, and after that court hearings will begin. I do not think the court verdict will be passed earlier than 1997...

SALZBURG

Photos by the author and from Paris-Match (France), Cambio 16 (Spain)

DOCUMENTARY

Captive in one's own country

Lev Razgon

All the documents that the NKVD Operation Sections issued lack not only regret for the dead, but even fear for the crimes committed. However, there was some degree of fear, not of God, not of the relatives of the dead, not of the human race, but of the bosses. And not for people, but for the dead having fallen short of the plan.

Continued from Nos. 31–33

Only fear of falling short of the plan, nothing more than that perturbed the vast thousands of bosses of every die and hue. No wonder Major of State Security Iorsh, chief of the NKVD Gulag Operations Division reacted to his Pechlag subordinate's "emergency reports" with his own "special report to the People's Commissar himself and his deputies. In that "special report" dated March 14, he declares:

"According to a cabled report from the Chief of the Operations Chekist sections of the NKVD Pechora corrective labour camp, the Pechorlag is in desperate straits.

"The camp's V group now accounts for 34.2 percent of the total prisoner population. In effect almost half the camp population is not working. In January 1,136 persons died, in February 968.

"Food railways freights are delayed. In some Pechora camp points bread shortages are frequent.

"Preparation of the North Pechora railway line for spring is falling down. The monthly earth works planned for February was fulfilled by but 26.9 percent.

"In view of the inferior standard of railway construction a protracted breakdown in traffic is possible in spring. Owing to the railway's unpreparedness, and traffic mismanagement, the February plan for freighting Vorkuta coal was fulfilled but by 14.5 percent.

"In January and February 1942 there were seven train crashes and sixteen accidents on the Pechora camp railway spur.

"In January and February the NKVD Pechorlag sustained losses totalling 27 million rubles. All related material was retailed on the spot to Comrade Zaveniagin, deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, by the chief of the Operations Chekist section of the NKVD Pechorlag."

One may form a notion of the significance attached to the Pechora camp even by the circumstance that Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Zaveniagin in person went out there as "pusher." He was high up in the system as a major slave owner in the Gulag empire.

Though Avraami Pavlovich Zaveniagin lived not so long from 1901 till 1956, his was a most eventful life. The relevant brief entry in the *Sovetski Entsiklopedichesky Slovar* (Soviet Encylopaedia Dictionary) says that he was a Soviet statesman, a CPSU member from 1917, who held the offices of Deputy USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs from 1941 through 1950 and of Minister of Medium Machine-building and concurrently of Vice Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers from 1953 through 1955. We are also told that he was a USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy, and a member of the CPSU Central Committee, that he had been awarded a State Prize and a chestful of Orders, including the twice awarded title of Hero of Socialist Labour, and that the USSR's largest sub-Arctic polymetals complex is named after him.

I have cited this brief entry to show that this man was not one of those butchers, big and small, who dealt with the generally speaking, rather simple processes of arrest, interrogation, torture, trial and execution. Unlike these butchers, who themselves were toppled by the machinery they themselves had set going and were rewarded with a bullet in the nape of the neck if happening to be not so lucky as Vyshinsky, who pegged out naturally, Zaveniagin was not only showered with honours while alive, but on his death was interred in the Kremlin wall.

No doubt he was a highly talented organizer. He built the Magnitogorsk Works and railways, and constructed in the sub-Arctic regions of permafrost and the six-months-long Arctic night, huge mines, plants, and the large, even comfortable city of Norilsk. He was head of the Soviet nuclear industry, for some reason officially styled "medium machine-building." At short order he got uranium mines and ore-dressing plants operating to produce nuclear bomb components. In his reminiscences Andrei Sakharov notes with astonishment Zaveniagin's talent as organizer.

However throughout his life this unquestionably erudite and gifted man dealt exclusively with slaves, wholly subservient to him. When he built the Magnitogorsk complex, there were no prisoners there under him, only free people. However, these "free people" were actually de-kulakized peasants or as yet not de-kulakized and as yet not arrested people, who had fled to this "great construction project" to escape arrest, deportation and the Gulag. However, they were of as much account as were the builders of the Cheops Pyramid in the eyes of its chief architect.



Subsequently, Zavenyagin dealt only with "Zek's," that is with prisoners. He had as many as needed legions and legions as he collaborated with Beria, country's chief supplier of slaves. One has yet to examine those top confidential dossiers noting of where the uranium mines were constructed and how, and where the people who had constructed these mines and had mined the uranium has gone. I have yet to meet a former Zek, who would have served his term at the uranium mines. In the autumn of 1950 I found myself in the transition prison of Georgievsk, a town near Stavropol. As war required, this prison systematically shipped convoys of prisoners out to the camps. One would have thought that the prisoners would fear most the four-to six weeks' journeys to the sub-Arctic north or the boundless steppes of Eastern Siberia. But they feared most that brief journey, not even by train, but just by truck, to the nearest camp which could be seen even with the unaided eye. That camp was located on the celebrated Mount Beshtau, that very same poetic mountain, associated with which is the name of the noted 19th-century Russian poet Lermontov, one that holiday-goers at the health resorts of Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk and Zheleznovodsk so greatly admire. For it has never entered anyone's head that located in this beauty spot amidst health resorts, was a place where thousands upon thousands died in agony.

To repent, as Germany did for its fascism

Curiously enough, the greatest state secrets come to the ears of those who would seem completely isolated, the Zeks. All in the Georgievsky transition jail knew that on Mount Beshtau there was a camp, whose prisoners worked a uranium mine, and that none had ever met a Zek back from that camp. Of course that "health resort" camp was minute compared to the huge uranium mines beyond the beyond, absolutely inaccessible to any eye.

Boss of these mines was Zaveniagin. He also constructed in the sub-Arctic polymetal mines and subsequently plants, to dress the mined ore and turn it into metal. Slaves alone were not enough, even though a goodly number of engineers, technicians and scientists were selected from among them. Free workers from inside Russia were enticed there by bountiful pay, and it was for them the Gulag prisoners put up sturdy, convenient houses, with hot and cold running water, sewerage gas and electric kitchens, as well as clubs, where during the long darkness of the Arctic night, they could relax in conservatories amidst flowers that blossomed even in winter-time, watch movies, or dance to a band composed of fine musicians sentenced to long Gulag terms. Incidentally, this sub-Arctic model city is often shown on our TV screen as an example of what could really be done to "make reality out of a fairy-tale" as the popular song goes. However, nought is left of the way in which this fairy-tale was translated into reality except for the name of the man, who supposedly built this marvel. One could cite Nikolai Nekrasov's well-known poem, in which a father tells his boy that one Kleinmichel built the railway running from St.Petersburg to Moscow.

We have no reason to count Zaveniagin a harsh-hearted sadist. On the contrary, prisoners, who served their terms in the Norilsk complex camps say that he was no brute, that he had chosen a legim of specialists from among the general run of prisoners and allotted them in jobs according with their callings, that he fed them better and that their general conditions were near-human. He never gained the reputation of a man who was cruel for cruelty's sake. On the contrary, he was quite human-like.

Only like a human, not himself a human? I simply can't bring myself to call him a human being. Look how many victims, how many human lives lie on the conscience of this educated, talented person! At some time in the future, which I most firmly believe, the archives of the so-called "medium machine-building" and the uranium industry camps will be made available. Accountancy in those industries was perfect, with the Operations Chekist sections putting their best foot forward not to let the bosses hide anything. We will eventually learn how there lived there and how long there lived there those who had once been human beings but were subsequently pulverized into "camp dust."

The 'camp dust' term is widely current nowadays. But it is no metaphor. On the contrary, it is an absolutely exact definition. All those prisoners who died by the thousands in the Pechora camp were not buried, but pulverized into bare soil, whose only difference from the usual earth was

ЛИЧНОЕ ДЕЛО

the large quantity of protein that laboratory tests dectected in it. The dead were tossed into in shallow pits and in a year or two, the fundamental biological process converted the corpses into dust, camp dust.

Avraami Pavlovich Zaveniagin saw all that with his own eyes and as always most attentively, perused all the "reports" and "special reports." In short, he was aware of everything! Can one compare him to Stalin? Can we put them side by side? Yes, we can. Not by reason of the legion of killed a sadistic viciousness, or an incredible perfidy, but by reason of far more important indicator. He simply did not regard people as human beings, as human beings like himself, as human beings with their own destinies, their own unique individualities, their own many ties with life.

One million shot each year

Butchers entertain the illusion of power. One might imagine a butcher wearing a sergeant's stripes, or a lieutenant's shoulder boards, thinking, as he levells his pistol at those condemned to death: "Now, I would appear to be a nonentity, a little man, while you're world famous, a leader, an academician, an actor or a writer, whose head is crammed with ideas, some even brilliant, but all it needs is for me to press the trigger and you'll become a pile of stinking flesh. So who of us is more powerful?"

But I am not at all sure the "doer" as the butcher was so tactfully termed in this country, was capable of such philosophical reflection. As for the Chief Butcher, he no doubt wallowed in his awareness of the power he exercised over the sundry Bukharins, Babels and Meyerholds. True, the power the despot exerts over genius and the price of that power have been long known. Anna Akhmatova rightly maintained that all the chief courtiers, ministers plus the Emperor of All Russia himself would be known to posterity only to the extent to which they were contemporary with Alexander Pushkin and had dealings with him. For that matter Herostrates believed sufficient the fame to which he aspired and which he nevertheless acquired!

So, what do I wish to achieve by these reflections over the few documents that have come my way? What do I seek? What do I really want? Is it to have tried the dead and the still living who pulverized tens of millions of people into dust, who swept across our land in a more fearful scourge than the plague in the Middle Ages? No, it is not to have them tried in the customary juridical sense that I desire. Still alive, even still seen now and again on TV screens are minor butchers and screws from among those who arrested, guarded and shot people. What satisfaction would we, ex-Zeks living out our last days or the relations of those who ground to dust, derive from the juridical trial of these senile persons whose unrepented vileness merits naught but contempt? None!

Neither am I convinced I would derive any satisfaction from the Communist Party, the Soviet state, the government, or the KGB, which see itself, even with some of pride, lawful heir to the Vecheka, the OGPU, the NKVD, and the MGB, repenting and begging forgiveness as the Japanese Emperor did of the inhabitants of Korea for the intervention, or as the present German government did for all the crimes of the fascists, or as Polish President Waleca did when on a state visit to Israel he asked forgiveness for Polish involvement in the annihilation and harrassment of Jews. They will not ask forgiveness as they deem themselves, and quite rightly so, the legitimate heirs of those who usurped power 73 years ago and who will stoop to any crime to hold on to that power. For they were power for themselves, who depended on nobody and were subordinate to no one. However greatly that huge, well organized totalitarian empire has been eroded and damaged by the winds it continues to stand firmly, even though some of its bricks have fallen out, even though its roof is leaking. There is nothing that they are afraid of, neither God, nor Satan, nor even the hungry. The only thing they fear, the only thing they cannot tolerate is the truth.

Meant is not that tame half-truth, which is worse and more immoral than any falsehood, but the real truth as is understood in every dictionary, what really happened. Currently the KGB does more than simply zealously



covers itself up in the skin of a lamb: it sports it employing conceivable modern means via media, fiction, the cinema and television. But who do they expect to fool? Vladimir Klyuchevsky noting a crucial aspect of human nature which refers to all, not only professional historians as himself, once said: "What it is still more interesting than anything else is to hear not what people say, but what they do not say."

Thus far those mandated to do that, to wit the president, the government, and the KGB, have not said how many people were annihilated for the sake of what some tactful persons have styled "the socialist experiment" but which from my point of view was the fundamental simple vulgar craving to retain absolute power over millions, robbing them of everything they had in order to enjoy forever with impunity the entire sweetness of dominion over human beings and all the material blessings at their full disposal.

In *Pravda* for February 14, 1990, the KGB stated that between 1930 and 1953, that is, over 23 years, 2,778,254 persons were arrested on charges of counterrevolutionary crimes, and of this number 786,098 were shot. How exact these blood-curdling inconceivable figures seem to be! The newspaper *Argumenty i Facty*, whose circulation runs into 33 million, cited a note that the KGB placed at the disposal of the committee, which the 20th Party congress set up to investigate Stalin's crimes. According to it, between January 1, 1935, and June 22, 1941 a total of 19,849,000 people were arrested; of this number 7,000,000 were shot, while most of the others perished in the camps. Which of these two documents is the more veracious? The later of the two? Yet the current KGB chiefs who so sensitively uphold the honour of their blood-stained uniforms, did not even try to refute in the press, or on television, the document featured in a newspaper that holds the world record for its circulation. We have every reason to believe the note that was compiled after the 20th Party Congress, when many thought the complete exposure of all the regime's crimes had started and would be continued.

Seven million shot in seven years! One million each year! Plus nearly 13 million who were not shot at once, but who were shipped off the Gulag to die there. That, mind you, was before the war started. How many, then, were shot or herded into the Gulag when the war began during the war, and after the war? Eventually, it will be possible to tally the number of those who were shot, as according to the procedures, an official chit had to be signed confirming that one more person had been shot.

But how are we to find out the exact statistics for all the people killed in the Gulag, whose hundreds of camps mushroomed like a typhoid rash on the body of this vast land? Everywhere people were killed, somewhere less, somewhere more, but nevertheless everywhere. This was not a bullet in the nape of the neck not instant death, but one of agony, an excruciating, lingering death. However attended by the flicker of hope that never dies in the human breast. After all, anyone led into a cellar by a butcher had no hope left at all. But those who died a lingering death in the Gulag still entertained to the very end the flickering hope that they might survive. Is that enough to count an instant death from a bullet preferable to all the inhuman agony in the Gulag Archipelago? That is not for me, a survivor, to say.

However, to lift up at least a tiny corner of that thick black veil which to this day hides the secret of the Gulag murders, have I commented upon but a handful of documents, just a few of that vast number, which attend a person's life and death in a totalitarian state.

Today much is written to the effect that we compile a book, actually a host of volumes recording only the names of the people who died in the great war against German fascism. A definitely noble, wonderful thought! However, surely the nation's conscience should cry out for a natural continuation of this grand project, a whole library giving the names of all the victims of our own fascism?

I think that would serve as the trial of all the butchers, from biggest to smallest, which bare justice and rightness demands. That would serve as the trial in which the human race would stand forth as judge, as that self-same judge, of whom the chief character in Pushkin's famous play said when addressing the murderer of just one human being, of juist one little boy:

"Thou will not escape the judgement of the people just as thou will not escape Divine judgement!" **THE END**

A chunk torn

Do emigrants lose touch with reality once they are abroad? Or do they gain new experience?

Kronid Lubarsky

The newly acquired freedom of the press, the flow of émigré literature, émigré publications, émigré utterings and evaluations that has flooded Soviet newspapers and magazines have sort of intoxicated the readers back home in Russia. Intoxication, however, always ends in a hangover – a state that is nowhere near sobriety.

Limonov & Co.

It was only a year ago when I was first given the opportunity to speak freely in the Soviet press (*Moscow News*), and I asked that émigré literature and émigré words be judged by the same yardstick that is applied to Soviet literature. Our different fate (tragic or happy – this depends on the particular viewpoint) does not make us any cleverer or any more significant; nor does it make us more stupid. Emigrants are a chunk torn from the nation's flesh. Thus, all the qualities of the nation – talent, conscience, or the lack of them – are evenly distributed on both sides of the border. Those who emigrated and those who stayed here must be equally judged, objectively and fairly. This is no paradox: as long as there remains any special attitude towards the emigrants, they will remain a separate world, a chunk living separately from the nation.

That is why I am grateful to Alla Latynina for starting an impartial dialogue in her article "When the Iron Curtain Went Up" (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 29/91).

However, I do not really think that this first serious discussion should have been started with Eduard Limonov. I believe that the Limonov phenomenon cannot be considered as a purely literary or political one. When he first appeared in the West in the 1970s, Limonov immediately found himself in the limelight for his "bold" description of homosexual relations and no less bold attacks against liberal dissidents like Sakharov and Litvinov, mixed with invectives against the corrupt capitalist system. Today's utterings by Limonov are by no means the games of an *enfant terrible* who wants to shock the reader in spite of the pro-capitalist slant of society.

The more remarkable thing is that Limonov may easily be the only émigré author who attracted the sympathetic attention of the Soviet press during "the stagnation era." Those who doubt this statement may refer to issues of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* dating back to the late 1970s, early 1980s. You will find an almost full-page article filled with praise for "the young writer" and his debut in literature – the novel *It's me – Eddie;* the very novel containing those "bold" descriptions.

One wonders what it is all about.

The objective discussion of émigré literature should have been started not with the author who is more associated with a different department than literature proper, but with such authors as Vladimir Maximov and Alexander Zinovyev, the Soviet attitude towards whom remains in the euphoric stage. Or, we must finally stop the incantations about "the colossal figure" of Alexander Solzhenitsyn and honestly and professionally evaluate his *Knots,* which are now accessible to Soviet readers as well.

Who dreams of a new Iron Curtain?

However, the homeland refuses to apply equal criteria to the word uttered at home and the one uttered abroad. To the contrary, the line of division between "our" and émigré authors has become more uncompromising and stringent. Accusations levelled at the émigrés are rapidly increasing in volume. Alla Latynina, for instance, brings out a clearly defined and merciless verdict: "The Iron Curtain went up – and it turned out that there was something more than just geographical distance that separated us. The simple truth is that we who are here wish every success for the reforms and want the Iron Curtain to disappear forever. As for those abroad – they would love to see the reforms collapse and a new Iron Curtain lowered, because this would justify their remaining outside their native country."

This is an extremely serious accusation and it is only natural to expect that the author will provide equally serious facts to confirm it. Meanwhile the few examples which are often cited now can illustrate any sins of the émigrés, including ill-considered light-weight utterings, vanity, a lack of reality, failed predictions, etc., but not the desire to see the reforms crippled and a new Iron Curtain lowered. Not supported by facts, such invectives turn into vicious insinuation.

I responsibly insist that no one from among the emigrants **has ever** wished that the reforms end and the situation revert to the time of the Iron Curtain. This is true not only of the circle of people whom I can call my political associates, but also of the people whose views I do not share and with whom I have had many bitter verbal duels.

There were doubts that any serious reforms could have started under the Communist Party aegis. There was fear generated by the promise of "more socialism" around the corner. There was the firm belief that really serious reforms were possible only if the political and economic fundamentals of the unviable system were resolutely rejected. Speaking of the wish to see a failure – I be-



Drawing by Piep Pedmanson

lieve the only failure that the emigrants really wanted to see was the failure of reforms "within the framework of the socialist choice," for this failure is unavoidable sooner or later. That is why it is important that the "socialist experiment" collapse as soon as possible, because this country lacks time, and if the said failure does not happen within a certain time limit, the situation will become catastrophic.

In the early days of *perestroika* all this was not as evident as it is now, but today it sounds a banality that hardly deserves to be committed to paper.

Emigrants have proved right once again, as have the dissidents.

What I have just written does not mean that I want "to convince others that one part of society consisted of cowards, conformists, slaves and idiots, and the other, better one, included the dissidents and later, emigrants." What the emigrants spoke about in the early days of *perestoika* was shared by many of those who stayed in the Soviet Union and there were no cowards at all. While *glasnost* evolved into freedom of speech, many of the emigrants' ideas and words started to appear in the Soviet press.

When serious hopes for more radical reforms appeared this spring, and when the Yeltsin factor appeared on the political scene (I am fully aware that this factor cannot be reduced to the personality of Yeltsin alone), almost the whole émigré community consolidated to support the Russian leader. I do not remember any other instance when emigrants belonging to different political factions, sometimes even political enemies, were as united as they were in expressing support and good luck to the leadership of Russia.

Emigrants have never been and never claimed to be "the best part of society," they have been simply a part of society, a part that was given a different fate. They were also the mouthpiece of the silent society and this was one of the main social functions of the emigration. As Nikolai Ogaryov said, "the only belief uttered is the one that is sacred."

God forbid "the exhausted mouth of a one hundred million strong nation" is shut once again (in which I do not believe, though). In this case the emigration will resume its hard but honourable mission.

However, there may be a reason why the emigrants so often are more accurate and far-sighted in their predictions. This reason is not connected with the emigrants' intellectual or moral superiority. I believe that there is no emigrant who has not heard accusations levelled at him or her from the Motherland to the effect that he (she) "has forgotten what kind of a country the Soviet Union is." The originality of émigré judgements can to some extent be explained by their loss of past experience. I can't understand why none of us has ever tried to look at the problem from a different angle and said: "It is highly unlikely that people who imbibed Soviet reality with their mother's milk can lose their experience so fast. They must be acquiring some new experience there, an experience we have no access to. This is interesting. Why don't we listen to them?"

Human rights activists and revolutionaries

One more example (not counting Limonov, who was mentioned in passing) is often cited in order to confirm the unfair play on the part of the political emigration. This is the example of Vladimir Bukovsky. Bukovsky has been having a rough time ever since he issued a call for a general political strike during his recent visit to Moscow. "He does not understand what is going on in the country. The emigrants are evidently losing touch with the Soviet reality when they are abroad... Sitting comfortably in Cambridge, Bukovsky can afford to believe that as soon as factories and plants stop, the situation in the country will be miraculously repaired."

I have always believed that that was **the wrong time and the wrong context** in which to call for a general political strike. It must

be admitted, though, that Bukovsky had ample reasons to issue his call: he came to Moscow in the spring of 1991, when the country was swept by coal-miners' strikes, the Vilnius massacre was still fresh in the memory, Premier Pavlov was unleashing a price attack on the population, and the hard-liners were stepping up efforts to "stop Yeltsin." It was far from the Novo-Ogaryovo accords then.

It may also be recalled that speaking several days before his death, Academician Sakharov, together with five more people's deputies, called for a general political strike. And Sakharov was in Moscow, not Cambridge, and hardly hoped for any "pie in the sky" as a result of his call.

Does this mean that we should transfer Sakharov from the human rights activists to the right-wing (or left-wing) radicals? If not, we will have to admit that human rights activists, too, can regard a strike or a walkout as a legitimate form of struggle.

One should not confuse the two concepts: the one of "human rights activism" and the one of "obedience to laws." If these concepts were really identical, then the only truly "human rights activism" principle would be Apostle Paul's commandment that each living soul obey the authorities. Unfortunately, laws can be unlawful, too, and history provides many examples of this.

The concept of "an unlawful law" has an inherent contradiction which cannot always be resolved internally. In some situations one has to go beyond the confines of the contradiction. For a revolutionary, this means a revolt. Human rights activists seek other ways.

On the one side of this line of division is the belief that "one's cause is only firm when it's been wetted with blood." On the other side there stands civil disobedience, the principles championed by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Strikes also belong here. A strike does not mean violence. Free people refuse to support the power, that has no respect for its own laws or that issues unlawful laws, by their labour. In fact, I am not discovering any new truths here. The democratic system of society in Western countries has not always been what it is now. The existing democratic systems were vastly shaped by the strike struggle headed by independent trade unions. Today we call the path covered by those countries the path of **reforms.**

I would like to supply one more remark and one more quotation before it: "... and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, **it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government**, and to provide new guards for their future security." These words are from the Declaration of Independence of the United States. This text expressing an idea which seems to be fundamentally opposed to the ideas of human rights activism has long been the foundation of a society that may easily be more committed to law than any other society in the world.

Why don't they return?

I was wrong when I said that usually there are no arguments confirming the fact that emigrants want to see the reforms crippled and the Iron Curtain back in place. The only, yet very serious argument which is readily available and carefully analysed is **the emigrants' reluctance to return.**

Not a single emigrant has returned so far, "except for a couple of celebrities who have agreed to receive Moscow flats." I could certainly object to the use of the words "agreed to receive": after all, those flats were not presented to them, but were simply the ones that the authorities had confiscated from them years ago. I could also mention the names of people other than those "Moscow celebrities," for instance, Paruir Ayrikyan, who has become very active in the political life of his native republic of Armenia and who is now a member of the Armenian parliament; writer Mikola Rudenko, who has returned to his native Kiev; poet Yury Kublanovsky became a Muscovite again even before he got a flat in Moscow (actually, he never had a flat – he lived in the cabin of a church night-time guard)... I could, but I will not. Basically, the fact remains: almost no one has returned. The example we are being reproached with is that of Polish and Czeck and Slovak emigrants who hastened to defend freedom in their countries. However, the situation in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia has nothing in common with the situation in the USSR as far as emigrants are concerned. Even in the hardest times, Polish emigrants were never stripped of citizenship. That is why after it became evident that there was no risk of being arrested or incarcerated back home, the whole problem of coming back was reduced to buying a ticked on the earliest train to Warsaw. Even under socialism, a Polish citizen could easily get Canadian or Peruvian citizenship without losing his Polish citizenship. And when socialism ceased to exist, that Pole could return home and run for presidency (I am not going to discuss the personal qualities of Tyminski, my only purpose is to show that there were no problems with Tyminski's registering himself as a presidential candidate).

Czechs and Slovaks were stripped of citizenship. But several weeks after the "velvet revolution," the Czechoslovak government apologized to the emigrants and asked them "to forgive the insults and injustices inflicted on them" and to return in order "to assist in the renewal of the country with their experience and means."

The Soviet Union is, as usual, different. It has already been six years since the beginning of *perestroika*, dubbed in the West "the second Russian revolution," and what about the emigrants? The President issued a decree returning Soviet citizenship to two dozen of more than two hundred people who had been expelled from the country and stripped of Soviet citizenship. No apology was offered at all. It was further suggested that the rest of the emigrants should personally appeal to have their Soviet citizenship restored.

Besides those two hundred there are also hundreds of thousands of people who were stripped of Soviet citizenship automatically without any decrees, on the principle of collective responsibility as "the ones emigrating to the State of Israel." It did not matter whether they actually Russians or Jews, Ukrainians or Tatars, it did not matter where they actually headed: Israel or America, France or Germany... It was only on the first of July of this year that the Soviet state stopped stripping Israel-bound emigrants of Soviet citizenship. People were losing Soviet citizenship last June: just think about it!

This practice was stopped thanks to the adoption of the new Free Travel Law (thank you, Jackson and Vanick!) and after the Constitution Committee pronounced that the secret decree ordering the removal of citizenship violated the Soviet Constitu-

tion, Soviet laws, and international accords ratified by the Soviet Union. What about the people who lost Soviet citizenship in 1967–91? Nothing doing. The decree is not retroactive. If you want to get your citizenship back, apply for it personally and **they** will decide whether you deserve to be reinstated. The Soviet authorities have long forgotten what the words "human dignity" mean.

Nowadays the state is kind enough to allow emigrants to visit the Soviet Union on tourist and other visas. Not all of them, though. Visas cannot be issued to people who are blacklisted – to be sure "all those who had struggled for the freedom of speech" are on those lists. Visas can only be issued to such people if they come as members of international delegations, but this requires special permission from the Soviet authorities, often even a sanction from the very top. Besides, if someone was issued a visa once, this does not mean that he will be issued a visa again.

Don't get the idea that one gets an entry visa in respect of the country as a whole. Visa holders can only visit cities and towns which are specified in the visa. Any deviation from the prescribed root is punishable, not by shooting, of course, but very often by expulsion from the country "for violation of the visa regime." The most recent expulsion took place early this year.

"We" and "you"

The Iron Curtain remains as far as emigrants are concerned. True, works of emigrants are filling Soviet periodicals. This does not mean, however, that readers in the motherland have an opportunity to form an educated opinion about the émigré literature and press.

You will never find Limonov's outrageous utterings in any respectable émigré periodical – no self-respecting editor would publish Limonov. Those old "political" exercises by Limonov were a part of his "erotic" writings and sold only as an unwelcome addition to much-sought-after materials. Once Limonov wrote a separate article, entitled "Why I don't Like Being Called a Dissident." The article was never published for lack of a subject: no one calls Limonov a dissident in the West.

Accepting the characteristically Soviet division into "ours" and "not ours," I would describe the situation as follows: "it is not **we** who have occupied your press. It is **you** who have taken away from **us** anything that **you** think is useful to you."

You don't need emigrants to get excited and enthusiastic. There is enough material at home as well. If you have already forgotten the corruption-buster Gdlyan craze, Mr. Zhirinovsky will soon refresh your memory.

"If you are indeed the bravest, the most honest, the best ones, why do you keep asking for rewards and not care about the well-being of the people who stay here?" emigrants are often asked.

Has anyone ever asked for any reward? What rewards are implied at all? High positons? Honorary titles? Orders? Money?

It looks like the word "award" means the recognition of the fact that the emigrants were the first to tell the truth.

In the early days of *perestroika* when the emigration was only starting to establish contacts with the homeland, I addressed a delegation of Soviet writers, asking them to assist us in our efforts for the release of political prisoners. I reminded the writers of the fact that the political prisoners' only guilt was that they were the first to say what everyone was saying then. My words at that meeting were interpreted as an attempt to grab a part of somebody else's fame and to demand a reward for that.

Is the release from prison a reward?

Today's greedy, awards-hungry emigration is compared with the ideological emigration that rushed back to the hungry and war-ravaged Russia? Naturally, all the necessary references are made to the responsibility for the October revolution and its consequences.

I am not going to recall that in that euphoric April of 1917 Russia was not really so hungry and war-damaged and when hunger and dislocation did come some time later, no one was returning to Russia. On the contrary, people were leaving the country and some of them were simply kicked out by the new regime (Berdyayev, Frank, Sorokin, Aykhenvald, Osorgin, Kizevetter, etc).

One thing will have to be mentioned, though, because it has a direct bearing on the question of "awards": the April 1917 emigration was pouring back to Russia to **take power.** And they took power in the country and soon rejected their own ideas.

Dissidents and human rights activists (including those who were expelled from the country) used to be accused of craving power. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* once called Sakharov "A ceasar who failed." If I am not mistaken, Sergey Kovalyov is the only one who has come to power – he is now chairing the Human Rights Commitee of the Russian parliament.

What do we do about them?

The conclusion which has been drawn i the homeland is merciless: we are divide into makers of history and passive on lookers, and the interests of the make and on-lookers do not coincide.

I sincerely wish that no one ever has t experience the justice of such reproache personally. It is only during tourist visits t "Paris kitchens" and "nice Russian Or thodox homes in New York" that one ca get an impression that emigration is th only place "where there are no lines an where people get spacious mansions in stead of those tiny Moscow apartments where one's mathematical or entrepreneu rial talents are duly appreciated." Naturally all this is true. But God prevent anyon from experiencing the nostalgia of write Anatoly Yakobson, who hanged himse and whose works have not so far been ap preciated at home, or the fate of the histo rian Vladlen Pavlenkov, who devoted hi years in America to making at least th postal connection between the emigratio and the mainland tolerable, and who finall jumped to his death from a window in a act of desperation.

The problem of emigration has only on solution. It can be resolved only **everyone** is given the right to freely retur home. Or to freely stay abroad. To make free choice. Like the Czechs have done.

How many people will return? Not ver many, perhaps just a few. Emigration fro the Soviet Union has largely been of th economic character. Those people will no return – people fleeing from economic di ficulties never return. After all, the ideolog cal emigration which returned to Russia i 1917 was not followed by peasants de scribed by Korolenko, Dukhobors from th USA, Lithuanians from Chicago, Ukra nians from Canada and Brazil.

Those who will return will be the most so cially active people, and they will not be Rus sia's worst people. Those who will not retur will stop being emigrants by today's highl politicized meaning of the word. They wi simply be Russian people who prefer to liv abroad for some personal reasons.

Only then will the inequality disappear an objective assessment of literature, ideas an personal conduct will become possible. Afte all, we love the works of Gogol and Turgene for their literary value, not because they wer written in Rome or Paris.

It is very simple: no state can call itself law ful as long as it continues to violate the right of even a small part of itself. However, it doe not seem that this simple truth will be ac cepted soon.

MUNICH

Order in the madhouse?

The draft law on psychiatry: prove your sanity first

Semyon Gurvits,
member of the Independent Psychiatric Association

Several days after the draft Law of the USSR on Psychiatric Assistance was published for discussion in *Meditsinskaya Gazeta*, a friend called me up, fuming with indignation:

"Is that your doing? Quite impressive..."

I really was a member of the working group of experts charged with working out the draft law in the Law and Order Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. By no means, however, can I claim personal authorship: the working group consisted of fourteen psychiatrists and lawyers. Four psychiatrists, myself included, represented the Independent Psychiatric Association. Many of our ideas never became part of the draft law. That is why we had to declare a special opinion at the sitting of the Public Health Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR devoted to the adoption of the draft.

Now that the draft law has been published, we believe we have the right to voice our objections. Perhaps this will help reduce the number of indignant calls.

During the seven-month effort to work out the draft we wanted to make the initial variant as universal as possible in order to transform it into law, which would protect the rights of all people.

We believed and continue to believe that however important the protection of the mentally disturbed might be, it is more important to respect the human dignity of all citizens any time they need psychiatric help.

The very concept of psychiatric help must not be reduced to the registration of all people who have once asked for a consultation with a psychiatrist in local psychiatric clinics (the word registration has not been officially used since 1988) and forceful confinement to mental hospitals. Psychiatric help also includes various psychiatric examinations, psychiatric consultations which may be necessary to diagnose a non-mental disorder, various professional checkups in which psychiatrists must participate, confinement to special schools, and mandatory institution of trusteeship. There are dozens of other circumstances under which citizens have to turn to psychiatrists. The diagnosis of "practically healthy" (which, in particular, means that the one diagnosed this way can study, reside in a shared accommodation, work, etc) is made more often than the opposite diagnosis. Thus, psychiatric help is rendered to tens of millions of people.

It would be bad if all these people familiarized themselves with the draft law without making any conclusions, understanding it as yet another legal regulator of the relations between the patient and the psychiatrist. It would be a pity if people regarded the law as one more attempt to establish order in the madhouse. There is no doubt that it has long been necessary to establish order in this sphere. The United Nations operates a whole system of principles applied to psychiatric assistance. As usual, we are several years behind the international practice.

But the law that is going to be presented to society has a deeper meaning: it regulates the relations between society and the mental patients, or people whose mental deficiency is only suspected. In this country, these relations have uncivilized and ugly forms. In defiance of laws, decrees, orders, rules of behaviour and simple common sense, the right to control the mental health of society was usurped by local authorities. For them psychiatry and psychiatric patients are something terrible and even threatening. Personnel sections, enrollment commissions at colleges, and housing-exchange bureaus operate under the monstrous presumption of mental inadequacy. Very often they are assisted by local health-care authorities and various clinics and hospitals that do not include psychiatrists in their staff. Under such guidance, they send people for psychiatric checkups and demand written certificates of mental health and adequacy.

Psychiatrists are human, of course. Doctors at psychiatric clinics rarely put up bureaucratic barriers and kindly issue the demanded certificates to applicants – after all, they are just pieces of paper certifying that the person in question is not registered as mentally disturbed. However, this humanism in reality supports the repulsive practice of total mental health checking programmes.

It is the presumption of mental adequacy alone that can put an end to the division of society into those registered and unregistered, to protect the people from the unending and humiliating necessity of proving their sanity. This presumption must become the basic principle of the law.

We have been insisting that the problem of the presumption of mental adequacy must be discussed in a separate article of the new law. It must be clearly stated that every citizen of this country is presumed mentally adequate until the opposite is determined in a lawful manner. No one has to prove one's sanity and no one can demand such proofs (except for the cases stipulated by law). It is necessary to put an end to the mass humiliation of the people by crude and unceremonious bureaucratic interference in their private lives. Both the mentally healthy and the mentally ill must breathe freely.

That is why we demanded that the title of the law be changed. Our variants were as follows: "The Law on Protection of Civil Rights in the Event of Psychiatric Assistance," "The Law on Social Guarantees in the Event of Psychiatric Assistance," and "the Law on Observance of Human Rights

in the Event of Psychiatric Assistance." Neither variant was accepted.

If the very name of the law contained the mention of human rights, the tone of the law might have been different. Such expressions as "persons suffering from mental disorders" would not have been used so frequently in the text of the law. Not all mentally disturbed people actually suffer from the disturbances. Protecting the rights of such people with the very best intentions, the law promotes a vision of such people as a retarded and inferior minority that deserves compassion, but may be dangerous. Besides, the roots of the absurd belief that any mental patient may be dangerous are very deep. This belief is shared not only by most law-makers as well. Article 36 of the Fundamentals of the Health Care Legislation of the USSR of 1969 lists all mental disorders without any exception as potentially dangerous to society. This article, and the Fundamentals as a whole, are still effective.

Meanwhile crime statistics accumulated for years demonstrate that harm done by mentally disturbed people makes up a negligible part of the wave of crime sweeping the country.

Drawing by Igor Smirnov

By the way, the main thing that the Independent Psychiatric Association has achieved while participating in the drafting of the law is the omission of the phrase "prevention of socially dangerous actions on the part of the mentally disturbed" from article 1 of the Law where this task was one of the principal objectives. The concrete tactics of psychiatrists concerning immediate danger to the life of surrounding people or a mentally disturbed person as a result of his mental illness is stipulated in separate articles of the law. It is absolutely unnecessary to add law-enforcing functions to the medical psychiatric service.

A police mentality must still be very strong in us, and we can't but feel nostalgia for the good old days when instructions stipulating immediate hospitalization of the mentally disturbed gave an unlimited field of action to psychiatrists and local authorities. Even the chief psychiatrist of Moscow spoke about the necessity "to prevent the socially dangerous actions of the mentally disturbed" when he appeared at a conference of chief doctors of psychiatric clinics.

If the presumption of psychological sanity became the basis for the new law, this principle – the division of society into a sane majority and a socially dangerous minority – would never become possible. To destroy and bury this segregationalist, almost racist concept, we have suggested a different heading for Article 5: not "the rights of the mentally disturbed people," but "mental health and civil rights." In our opinion, the first paragraph of the article should begin with the words: "All citizens, regardless of mental health deviations, have all constitutional rights..."

The rest of the working group did not agree with us, though. The presumption of sanity was mentioned in the preliminary variants of the law, but it had disappeared by the time the law had been completely worked out. The last fragments of the presumption were included in Article 16: "Limitation of rights of the mentally disturbed."

At the same time, a vague sentence that worried a lot of people was added to part 2 of Article 16: "Persons who as a result of manifested psychological disturbances cannot personally satisfy the basic life requirements and are unable to intelligibly consent to the rendering of psychiatric assistance..." Before that the wording was different: "As a result of manifested psychiatric disturbances, which lead to the refusal of psychological help, persons incur considerable damage to their own health as well as moral and material damage to themselves and other persons..."

The problem is the large group of mentally disturbed patients who were protected from mandatory hospitalization by the January 5, 1988 Decree because they did not constitute an immediate physical threat to themselves or to other persons. While allowing such patients to stay at home, the decree doomed many of them to nothing less than starvation. Many of them do not pass special labour-adequacy commissions and do not receive any pensions, believing that they are perfectly healthy. Since they do not constitute a social threat, they can live with relatives, thus dooming the latter to experience various daily difficulties. Why formulate this article so vaguely once again? On the other hand, the law stipulates hospitalization of such patients on a court verdict.

These are the main considerations which the Independent Psychiatric Association presented in its special opinion. We believe that if this special opinion is not heeded during the discussion of the draft law at the session of the Supreme Soviet, if the purely professional aspects of the law prevail over shared human values, a loophole for unlawful actions will be preserved in the legislation.

It is even more terrible that as a result of all this, the moral deficiencies of society which facilitate discrimination against the mentally disturbed may be preserved.

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

The Korf family lived in Russia for several centuries. Its members came from Westphalia and served at various European courts, but they settled down mainly in Russia. In their new country some members of the Korf family had brilliant careers. There were diplomats, generals, scientists, and public figures among them. However, only one of them is mentioned in present-day biographical dictionaries and reference books. It is Modest Korf, who was a contemporary of the great Russian poet Pushkin, an historian and publicist. But present-day encyclopaedias do not mention Nikolai Korf, a noted Russian educationist. Other distinguished members of the Korf family are not mentioned either.

Sergei Korf, author of an essay on a Russian federation written in the early 1920s and published in a slightly abridged form in this issue of *NT*, was an historian and lawyer, and a professor at the University of Helsinki, where he chaired the department of Russian and comparative law. He was a splendid lecturer who perfectly mastered the art of teaching. The manuscript legacy of Sergei Korf is not large. Being an original thinker, he turned his attention to a problem which did not seem important to some of his contemporaries. It is only now that we are beginning to understand its significance. It is the problem of federalism. Speaking in present-day terms (and taking the country's present system into account), it is the problem of union or community, redistribution of sovereignty.

Sergei Korf already understood at the beginning of the century that the empire was doomed, and for this reason he turned to the problem of federalism. At first, he studied foreign experience, which prompted him to think about the country's future, and then he considered the structure of a future confederation or federation on the territory of the former empire.

Korf summed up his thoughts in works published abroad. He lived in many capitals where Russian emigrants had settled and eventually wound up in the United States. In the late 1920s he delivered lectures there for a short time. Sergei Korf fell seriously ill and died in obscurity. We do not know the date or place of his death.

The text of Sergei Korf's notes written in Paris was prepared for publication by Andrei Edemsky.

Is federation possible in Russia?

Sergei Korf (1876– ?)

For most people the question of a Russian federation has been shrouded until now in a dense fog and the thought of it simply frightens many. The first task of the Russians is to overcome the feeling of animosity. They must be guided by logic and foresee the future.

I personally have never doubted that a federal form is quite possible and acceptable for a future Russia. The thriving of the federal system in many countries is a real manifestation of its beneficial significance for our reborn homeland, too. I think it is generally admitted now that one of the sad pages in our tsarist past was the government's foolish, short-sighted and wicked policy on the national question.

Since the middle of the 19th century, the national self-consciousness of peoples who lived quietly in the shadows of powerful Russia has begun to awaken. But instead of encouraging this process and simultaneously building firm ties between these nationalities and the central state, the government pursued an unwise policy of oppression. Moreover, owing to inexperience and lack of courage, it never had a well-thought-out programme. As a result, oppression assumed the form of absolutely needless pinpricks...

Towards the end of the century, when national self-consciousness had awakened in many outlying areas, St. Petersburg firmly set the policy of nationalist reaction. The persecution of Germans, Finns, Ukrainians and other peoples can be recalled here. Instead of living in friendship, realizing that small nations need only protection and aid from the big nation, St. Petersburg created a feeling of enmity and complete distrust. The tsarist government was easily identified with the Russian people, who had nothing to do with, and were not even aware, in most cases, of the Russification policy conducted by their government.

As a result, the small nationalities began to look at Russia only as a source of oppression, and this feeling penetrated deep into the oppressed masses. Since this process developed at a time when their own self-consciousness was shaping, hostility towards Russians became deeply rooted in the subconscious part of their outlook.

No wonder that (after the revolution) the peoples living in the fringe areas began to demand full independence in forms offensive to the Russian national state, while Russians began to hate them, because they took advantage of their misfortunes in order to get their piece.

The territorial position of nationalities in the former empire was advantageous to Russia. All of them live in its borderlands. Thanks to such a location Russia does not have the difficult problem of national "islands" as, for instance, does Hungary or Romania. However, it has a more complex problem of the variety of national demands. What is good for Estonia may not suit Georgia, and vice versa. The degrees of cultural and state development, the significance and measure of purely Russian interests are very different in the outlying areas. In view of this, the example of the United States of America or Germany is

not at all acceptable to us. It is perhaps one of the basic principles of a future Russian federation. It cannot be a federation of a unitary, American type, in which all constituent parts are equal. A most likely example for Russia is the British empire composed of various parts unequal in rights.

A new conquest, the violent advance of the great Russian centre seems to be the terrible but only alternative to a Russian federation. In the event of restoring the "unity" of statehood (an empire of some kind), that is, conquest, there is no hope for peace, because the vanquished nationalities will not voluntarily submit to Russian government. They will regard Russian government as an enemy and an oppressor, countering it by every possible means.

Further, the basis of any federation is a balance between its centrifugal and centripetal forces. It is rather easy to determine the *centrifugal* forces of our former empire. As shown above, they are reduced to the present hostility and the desire of peoples – caused by oppression on the part of the tsarist government and foreign propaganda – to achieve their own cultural and national ideals and their national development. Fortunately for Russia, political motives played a minor part until recently, and have been stirred up exclusively by the atmosphere of the Bolshevist regime.

> The first task of the Russians is to overcome the feeling of animosity. In their behaviour and policy they must be guided by logic and clearly foresee the future

Let us try to examine the character of the *centripetal* forces. They can be social (national), political and economic. In our case the social-national forces play a minor role. The Russian nation grew independently, and beginning with the 15th century, the Russian state grew from within, so to speak. The development proceeded irresistibly, slowly by steadily pushing the Russian centre, the great Russian nucleus to the Baltic, White, Black, and Caspitan seas and to the Pacific. At times the process was halted only to revive with renewed strength later on.

It can be said in conclusion that the centre needs free access to seas, a free economic exchange with the outside world, well protected frontiers, freedom of national defence, and a structure of international relations that would protect it from the possible exploitation of the neighbouring peoples by other powers. Other interests of the centre are reduced only to a further development of the above-mentioned ones.

On the other hand, the peoples living in the outlying areas are interested in national self-determination, in the possibility of free development protected by law, in the strengthening of their national self-consciousness and culture. If these interests are firmly secured, the peoples of the fringe areas will merely benefit from their federation with the great Russian centre, for they will be unable to stand the hard struggle for existence. Besides, in most cases they are attracted to Russia by their economic interests. They need either the Russian market or Russian raw materials. The assistance of Russian capital will also play a big part in the future.

The interests of Russia can be protected and guaranteed only if it maintains friendly relations with the neighbouring peoples. Let us take national defence, for instance. However Russia may try to secure its borders, build fortresses, or conclude treaties with peoples in the fringe areas, if the latter re main hostile to it, the enemies will always be able to explo them to our detriment. The territories of these peoples ar situated in such a way that they can always serve as conve nient bases for the deployment of enemy troops. There can b no talk of economic interests either. They may not develop a all if Russia fails to win the friendship of its neighbours.

A closer examination of the nationalities living on th periphery of the Russian state brings to light the great variet of their internal cultural and political development. A certain though rough scale can be set in this respect in the future While concluding a federal treaty with the Baltics or Georgia for instance, it will be necessary to exactly determine Russia interests and then work out federal interests as distinct fron the local interests of the contracting parties.

The federal interests, concerning the state as a whole, wi include not only defence foreign policy, trade, and indus try, but also finances, mone circulation, the postal service communication, especially rail ways. After federal interest have been determined, it wi also be necessary to form fed eral bodies as distinct from th government bodies of the con tracting parties. It can be sai with regard to Siberia and the areas inhabited by Cossack that their national identity is less evident, if it exists at al though these territories should be given a large degree of in dependence in the running of their local internal affairs. It wi not occur to anyone to prevent them from doing that. Let ther run their own affairs for the good of Russia, in the name o friendship and concord.

The financial question has always been one of the mos complex in the history of all federations. How to organize th system of federal finances and how to distribute the stat debts and duties between the federation and its componer parts. It is also one of the most difficult problems for Russia However, it will be *much more difficult* to solve it in the even of the separation of component parts from the former empire.

Let us imagine for a minute that Estonia or Georgia, Latvi or Lithuania will become independent of Russia. Two cardina questions arise in this case: what part of the debt of th former state each of them will have to pay, and what is th size of compensation to be paid to Russia for its state prop erty by a newly independent state. Both questions are fraugh with unexpected consequences. For instance, if the state deb is distributed according to the size of the population – and is the *only possible* criterion acceptable to both parties – the such an immense debt will fall on a newly independent stat that it will never be able to pay it; we must bear in mind her the disastrous condition of outlying areas and their sma economic resources.

In other words, however we may try to distribute the stat debt and financial legacy of the former empire between th newly formed states the debt to be paid by them will be in credibly large, and from the very outset of their statehood will lay a heavy burden on them, hindering their futur economic progress. On the other hand, the great Russia centre will obviously be unable to free the newly independen

states from their onerous burden, and it will have no right to do that in defiance of its people. Only unscrupulous Bolsheviks could agree to combinations like their peace treaties with Estonia or Latvia. It will be recalled that the Bolsheviks simply paid these republics off at the price of the gold stolen by them.

If we proceed from the future of Russia as a federation, the above-mentioned problem can be solved much more easily, because in the given case the debt of the former state will be fully paid by the federation and the question of distribution will concern merely the procedure and methods of paying the interest rate and other payments. This is much less difficult, of course, and can be conducted in forms not burdensome for the states united into a federation.

As for the second cardinal question, one of compensation to be paid to Russia for its state property, it can be decided much more easily when a federation is formed, and it will be very hard to decide this question when different parts of the former state fully secede from it. In the first instance, the right of ownership of state property goes directly to the federation, and the "fathers" of the Constitution will merely have to decide how the federal parts will use this property. In the second instance, an additional and very heavy burden will fall on the newly independent states. They will have to compensate Russia for the numerous forms of state property acquired by their peoples. The value of all these forms of state property is very high, and the great Russian centre will have no grounds to abandon them by transferring state property as a gift to newly independent countries. The joining of an all-Russia federation by these peoples seems therefore the simplest solution to the problem.

Let us examine now the state system of a similar, rather motley federation. Each of its constituent parts, the great Russian centre included, of course, will be able to establish its own system, in conformity with local demands... The distribution of functions between the federation and its constituent parts must agree with the following general principle: what has not been clearly stated as federal powers to be exercised by federal bodies lies within the jurisdiction of the constituent parts of the federation.

The federal system provides for the following central, federal bodies: a) *head of the state,* with the electoral law and order to be identical for all constituent parts of the federation; b) *federal legislative bodies,* with the lower chamber to be elected by the entire population, and the upper chamber to be composed of representatives of the constituent parts on an equal basis; in the given case there are so many examples in history and well devised systems that it will be easy to choose an appropriate system; c) nor will it be difficult to create a system of *federal courts* to examine all disputes involving federal interests, conflicts between constituent parts of the federation, and the interpretation of the federal constitution (the last mentioned function is especially essential); d) the structure of *federal administrative power* always presents the greatest difficulties.

The head of the federation must operate with the help of the ministry accountable to the federal parliament. However, the functions of federal ministries will vary depending on the unequal distribution of powers between the federation and its constituent parts. For instance, some ministries will function on the territory of the entire federation (defence, navy, foreign affairs). Others will operate only in certain parts of the federation (for instance, means of communication, trade, etc.). The area under the control of these departments and bodies can therefore be determined only after the conclusion of federal agreements, and it will become exactly known what degree of independence is given to each constituent part of the federation.

Lastly, the relationship between the local and federal executive bodies will be the most difficult and perhaps most contentious issue. Serious conflicts of interests are inevitable here, and much tact and foresight will be needed on both sides to settle them. It seems most desirable that all parts of the federation have parliamentary ministries while the heads of constituent parts maintain close contact with the federal centre. The interests of both sides would be ensured in this way. The constituent parts could have their representatives under the federal government.

> Russia and the central government cannot hope for peace if the unity of statehood is achieved by new conquest and great-power policy

In what way can a Russian federation be established?

The following principles are evident in this respect: 1) no federation can be formed by force, against the will of its future constituent parts; 2) as we mentioned above, only the conquering of borderlands, a new violent social process of the "expansion" of the great Russian nation from within, its tireless advance towards open seas can be an alternative to a federation; the inertia of 100 million people living in the centre is sufficient in this case, and no artificial barriers can restrain it; 3) hence only a third way is possible – a *peaceful* agreement of friendship between the *centre* and the outlying areas. If we accept this way as the only correct one, the basis of a future federation can clearly be worked out by means of agreements between the centre and the outlying areas only in view of the diversity of national demands (cultural, political, economic, and social) of the peoples who inhabit them. In devising such agreements the parties should have in mind a certain community of institutions and principles. The details of the federal system can be determined only after the conclusion of a number of above-mentioned agreements.

An agreement should not necessarily be concluded right away with all constituent parts of a future federation. It can be reached first with several constituent parts which will form the original centre. The other nationalities will be given an opportunity to join the federation later, though the subsequent accession will clearly be less advantageous because they will have not taken part in setting forth the main principles and will have to accept them in ready form; 4) in all cases a firm agreement can be achieved provided it has been approved by a popular vote. Such are the foundations of a possible future Russian federation. It is *possible, desirable, and necessary.* An alternative seems terrible to us, while the uniting of the peoples of the former empire into a federation will form a solid basis for the further development of Russian culture itself and the national self-consciousness of the united nationalities.

iety that has no traditions of social and political life and that has just liberated itself from totalitarianism. Artists and writers, i.e., spiritual leaders, are necessary during a time of radical change... Other necessary things include common sense and the ability to vacate the scene in time..."

* * *

A prominent Lithuanian poet, whose verses have been read for four decades already, **Justinas Marcinkevicius,** has become a victim of political struggle.

Two Lithuanian TV journalists declared that Marcinkevicius had written one of his stories, *The Laughing Pine-Tree,* under orders from the KGB. The poet has resolutely denied the accusation saying that no authority or person has ever told him what to write.

The poet insists that when this story, devoted to problems of young people, was first published, someone spread rumours about the prototypes of the main characters. There were at least three persons claiming to have been the prototypes of the story's main character. At that time Marcinkevicius insisted that the characters were entirely fictional. Now the old scandal has come back to haunt the author.

The name of Macinkevicius is closely connected with Lithuania's independence movement. An active participant in the political life of Lithuania, he has never made his civil stance secret. Says he:

"Politics is a bad business, especially in a soc-

Bruno Ritter, 63, retired US Army officer, has never told anyone about his past. If asked about the strange accent that can be detected in his otherwise perfect English, he tried to change the subject. Bruno once came across the photograph of a Nazi war criminal, **Josef Schwammberger,** (insert left) in a newspaper. After that Bruno started to talk...

Before the war the Ritter family used to live in the small Polish town of Przemysl. Bruno was 13 when Nazis started raiding the town locking Jews in ghettos. There was only one way out of the ghetto – the extermination camp. Massive arrests were carried out by the local SS force commanded by Schwammberger.

Bruno remembers how his mother was put on a train and how she shouted to him: "Don't get on this train! You will survive and see your brother!" At that time Bruno's brother was already serving in Polish troops formed in the Soviet Union. Bruno did not manage to escape. He spent the last years of the war working at a German plant. After liberation he worked at a shoe-shine parlour in the American occupation zone, then enrolled as an interpreter and then started to serve in the US Army. In 1947 Bruno came to Poland hoping to find some of his relatives. It turned out that his neighbours were keeping the letters from his brother Joseph from the Soviet Union. In 1963 Joseph emigrated to the United States.

After the war Schwammberger was arrested by French troops. He was caught carrying eight bags of jewels and gold tooth caps. The former SS man was arrested and formally charged with the murder of 27 Jews in Poland. Later Schwammberger managed to escape from the train on route to the American military tribunal mission in Austria. He popped up in Argentina where he lived under his real name and was even granted Argentine citizenship. In 1990 the Argentine authorities extradicted him. His lawyers say that his condition may prevent Josef Schwammberger, now 79, from facing trial. The prosecution has already found 73 witnesses who say that they saw the SS officer sending about 800 men, women and children into the gas chamber, shooting and hanging Jews in Poland, and crashing children's heads against walls, and setting dogs on children. Bruno Ritter is one of these witnesses.

A dignified exit

Shinji Sakai, 71, is soon to resign as director of Japan's official news agency, *Kyodo Tsushin.*

In May this year shortly before the 6th anniversary of Sakai's stewardship of Japan's largest news agency, a scandal broke out around one of the materials reported by *Kyodo Tsushin.* Some busybody reader discovered that *Kyodo Tsushin* reports were suspiciously similar to the the series of articles on the same topic carried by the influential Japanese newspaper *Asahi* 17 years ago. The *Asahi* editors did not hesitate to bring out the charges of plagiarism. Without waiting for a trial, the *Kyodo Tsushin* editors admitted responsibility and publicly apologized before the newspaper, readers, and all subscribers to its information. Simultaneously, *Kyodo Tsushin* fired the journalist who was responsible for the scandal, reprimanded many agency executives and started a professional investigation. The conflict was settled strictly in the spirit of the laws of journalistic ethics accepted in the Japanese media. Few people remembered the unpleasant episode after a month's time.

However, for the agency itself the scandal could not remain just a bad memory. The scandal damaged the journalist's most treasured possession: the reader's trust. At the end of July the special investigation committee presented its report and the plaintiff, *Asahi,* reported that the director of *Kyodo Tsushin* had declared he would resign, thus indirectly admitting his responsibility.

This is something of a tradition in the Japanese establishments. The act of resignation symbolizes the moral purification of both the outgoing head and the agency itself. By accepting the resignation appeal the agency pledges to carry out its duties meticulously in the future.

People's actor of the USSR, **Evgeny Matveyev,** 69, has played Brezhnev once again. In 1977 the actor played Brezhnev in the war epic "Soldiers of Freedom." This time Matveyev plays Leonid Ilyich in a film about the Soviet mafia.

"I would not like to make excuses," Matveyev said. "This is my profession: I play Brezhnev today and I will play a folk tale character tomorrow. I refused when the film director initially suggested that I show Brezhnev as a decrepit old man with all the characteristics of old age. Later I changed my mind, though. I will play Brezhnev. It is a fashion now to portray our former leaders mockingly or disparagingly, but I will not stoop to such 'heroics.'"

Matveyev has worked in film for almost fifty years already. He studied in an acting school under the Kiev film studio in the 1940s. In 1952 he joined the company of the famous Maly Theatre and has been with it ever since. He acted in scores of films, including *Virgin Soil Upturned, Emelyan Pugachev, Resurrection,* etc. His characters include workers, kolkhoz peasants, directors of factories... Every character played by Matveyev was an expression of his faith. Matveyev believes that the influence of the Communist Party committees is still felt in this country. "I do not think that the Party is powerless to do anything in these conditions," said Matveyev, "I have never been disloyal to the Party and I never will be. I have been a Party member for forty years already, and I am prepared to serve the Party now. But the Party does not seem to need me..."

* * *

Joan W.Reed from North Carolina, USA, is living in Moscow heading the American branch of the Centre for Soviet-American Dialogue, a public organization set up in 1984 by the Soviet Peace Committee and peace-loving organizations from the American city of Seattle.

Joan Reed first came to the Soviet Union as a tourist several years ago. Later she decided to come back to the USSR and start working in this country.

"I was impressed by this vast beautiful country, and even more by the magnanimity and fortitude of the Soviet people. On the other hand, I understand that Russian people's patience has delayed the processes which could have started much earlier," said Joan.

So, she has become the Centre's representative, a Soviet American woman, as they call her jokingly.

Before coming to the Soviet Union Joan spent twenty years working as a marketing and advertising manager, consultant, and journalist. She owns three California-based companies: the advertising agency Joan Reed Associates, the promotion company Joan Reed's Panache, and a consortium of 50 trade and management experts from California and the West Coast called Reed's Resources.

Shortly after she was appointed to Moscow, Joan Reed became the coordinator of the second meeting of the Soviet and American public held in January 1990. The meeting was attended by Soviet and American representatives – experts in various fields of activity, who came up with over one hundred joint projects in medical care, ecology, education and business. Many projects are already under way: for instance, the relief project for the Chernobyl disaster victims and the construction in Moscow of a maternity centre equipped with the latest Western equipment. Other projects, like Project Teleport (the development of a space fax network connection between the USSR and the USA,) and Rubles and Dollars For Moscow Streets are being worked out.

E.Kudeliva

Private property – public concern

President of the union of private owners of Russia, **Viktor Shchekochikhin,** 40, is not going to wait for people's deputies of all levels to decide whether private ownership can be permitted in this country, or whether the Soviet people will accept it. Shchekochikhin believes that private owners must uphold their interests themselves, in particular, working in the bodies of power. That is why the union will take part in whatever election campaign will be held.

"Our objective is to promote private enterprise in the Soviet Union," said Viktor Shchekochikhin. "And I understand that we will lose if we don't get involved in politics or define the problem of ownership."

That is why Shchekochikhin's union is open not only to private owners, but also to potential private owners who share the organization's aims and principles. The only membership restriction is the applicant's moral image. Moral fortitude, Viktor believes, has always been an economic category: if there are no gentlemanly relations between businessmen, there will never be any honest competition necessary for economic progress. There will only be money-grabbing and cheating. So far, the Soviet Union has only been toying with the idea of free market relations. Viktor knows what it means to start a private business in the Soviet Union from his own experience. Before becoming president of the union of private owners he worked for the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, then as an auditor for the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine-Building and then returned to the foreign trade ministry. After the adoption of the law on individual enterprise, he registered the right to work as an independent financial and economic consultant and opened an accounting school. After he earned enough money, he opened a family cooperative and the association Zemlyane.

Watching the development of small ventures, lease-holding, and cooperatives, Viktor Shchekochikhin realized that there would be no private ownership in this country as long as the collective approach prevailed. There are few people who can run a business independently, who possess "a sense of private responsibility." This being so Viktor decided to unite such people.

The second congress of the union of private owners has defined the organization's task as promotion of private farming. It has been decided to set up a special bank Zemlyane, which will issue preferential loans to budding farmers. The union itself will try to help farmers set up processing facilities and wholesale trading establishments.

I.Zharkikh

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

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

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Bonfire in the night

Tatiana Ivanova

Why don't we see Gypsies any more in Moscow? Why have the democratic city authorities been so resolute in purging the capital of Gipsies? Where is that miserable legless boy who used to beg in one of the underpasses? He and his mother were getting on quite well in Moscow living on alms. Where are they now?

My age is full of troubles as it is, but Leonid Mlechin's article. *The Gypsy Ballad (NT* No. 32) upset me so much that I could not put it out of my mind. "Like Jews, Gypsies are fleeing to Germany" were the introductory words of this article. And closer to the end there were other words: "Gipsies are not liked. And the authorities know that no one would put in a word for gipsies."

Leonid Mlechin's article described the gipsies' situation in other countries, not the Soviet Union. It contained some Soviet examples as well, though. And the desperately sad impersonal. sentences: "Gipsies are not liked and no one would put in a word for the Gipsies," are about us.

This summer I saw no gipsies in Moscow. Once in spring a beautiful young woman wearing a wide flower-patterned skirt got on the trolleybus I was riding. She was holding an olive-skinned black-eyed baby closely tied to her with a scarf. I marvelled at the grace of the woman, her light steps and proud posture. "Lipstick, anyone need lipstick, girls!" she called as she walked down the trolleybus aisle holding on to nothing. "They ought to be shot, those bloody profiteers," said a voice near me. "They've fouled the city, they are dirt and filth, they all ought to be shot." It was a woman speaking. I stepped in: "What do you think you are saying? You surely have kids, too... Shot... The word is terrifying to utter, to say nothing of the actual doing..." My confused words only added to the woman's wrath: "I would shoot them myself, and my hand wouldn't tremble. If you speak up for them, you must be no better than they are..."

I am absolutely helpless in such debates. I could respond to my irreconcilable opponent only mentally and I kept responding to her all evening, on my way home, while tidying up my flat, while trying to sleep... You are so sure, Madame, that your monumental, heavily-lacquered hairdo, your equally monumental bust, your heavy gait, your evil eyes and your hoarse voice uttering boorish words, your nightmarish gold ear-rings are adding beauty to Moscow, while the gorgeous gypsy woman is spoiling it. You are so sure that everybody is enjoying the sight of you, values you, loves and respects you... Oh, God, is it really so difficult to understand that anyone living in this world is some other person's darling and beloved one? Is it really so difficult to understand that if only the monumental matrons or the black-eyed beauties were left on Earth, this world would become dull and grey, it would be impossible to love and no one would need it...

Why don't I see Gipsies in Moscow? Why have the democratic city authorities been so resolute in purging the capital of them? Where is that miserable legless gipsy boy who used to beg in one of the big city's underpasses? In the more generous and prosperous Moscow he and his mother managed to collect enough to make ends meet. Where are they now? Who's giving them money?

My dear Russian people, have a closer look at yourselves: some of us have high cheek-bones betraying a Tatar descent, almost a half of native Leningraders have the proud Finnish posture, a fair-haired girl, the native of the Russian town of Tver, would suddenly cock her head in a manner revealing some Central Asian roots.

And everybody is at home on this land. Everybody has roots here. This land has been soaked with the tears and blood of our ancestors our Russians, our Jews, our Tatars, our Gipsies. What greater relation do you want? What roots? What blood?

We are all a family. My dear fellow people, don't leave, don't run away, stay with us for God's sake. What shall we do without you?

...I remember the small impoverished bombed-out town where I lived after the war. My granny and I are going across the field to milk our cow. We are carrying a chunk of bread with some salt for the cow. The cow, affectionately named Dochka (daughter), will be happy to see us... We 'll say: hello, Dochka, come here... Good girl, we've been missing you, too... Give us some milk and when you come home this evening we'll give you some nice fresh hay...

Dochka's eyes are clever, almost human. My granny is wearing a white shawl and she looks beautiful. The field, the sun, the path in the field... Farther away there are some cows grazing, and after Granny has milked dochka, we'll go further to the woods to share some tea with the Gipsies in their tent camp.

Gipsy women will lay a big flower-patterned cloth on the emerald grass. They will lay out a shining *samovar* and beautiful tea cups. Granny will produce some sugar from a tidy piece of linen fabric – this

Gipsy encampment – where is it now?

TASS Photo

is our contribution to the feast. An old Gipsy woman will bring a pot of steaming potatoes, some onions and bread. The women are having an unhurried, sad and serious conversation. God will forgive my Orthodox granny for asking her olive-skinned friends to tell her fortune. There is something to ask for for my granny in 1949 in the heartland of Russia...

And I am having fun with the jolly Gipsy children who are never short of tricks and fantastic stories...

...In spring I met a Gipsy woman in the street. The first thing I thought was where they get such beautiful skirts – and I should have thought where they get such graceful gaits... "Come, let me tell your fortune, the nice one, the lovely one...," says the woman to me. Where have they expelled you to from Moscow, you kind heart? Who will call me "the nice one, the lovely one..." now? Who will assure me that everything's going to be OK?

Alapayevsk... The name of this small town in the Urals is often mentioned over the radio now: there have been Gipsy pogroms there. Will no one step in to defend Gipsies? I can't believe it, it's something that can never be. I am going to tell you who will step in. If Gipsies read *New Times*, they will pick up this issue and go straight to the people whom I am going to name – and get protection from them.

Several years ago the popular weekly *Nedelya* carried my article about Ivan Samoilov from Alapayevsk. He had graduated from a Moscow college where he received training as an irrigation engineer. He used his spare time, holidays and vacations to engage in the voluntary undertaking of reconstructing the Church of the Transfiguration in Alapayevsk together with some friends. The tall bell-tower, the high eightier dome and the smaller dome over the altar. Actually, the church was rebuilt from scratch and the reconstruction effort was paramount to the actual construction. Just imagine the effort it takes to build the scaffolding alone. Samoilov did that. Now imagine the completely restored domes, the main entrance, the tiers, the window frames, the columns, the elaborate cast-iron fence. Inside the church he restored the ornate cast-iron floors, the frescoes and the grilles on the windows... While reconstructing the church Samoilov worked with carpenter Okulov, mason and plasterer Anokhin, mason Kozlov, carpenter and plasterer Perovskikh, mason Sorokin, and roofer Zuyev.

If these people built a church, they will not destroy their souls at the same time. If people can build a church, they will be able to preserve human friendship. They will be able to defend the repressed and the persecuted.

It would be good if we were able to shout it to the miserable Gipsies of Alapayevsk: call Ivan Samoilov. Call friends, step to protect the Gipsies. Here in Moscow people say no one would put in a word for Gipsies. Will "people of the Russian nationality" have to live through this disgrace, too?

In the evening Granny and I went out to meet Dochka coming home from the pasture. The cows were slowly pacing across the green field. A bonfire was blinking near the forest and sparks were flying high into the air. "Gipsies are not liked?" "No one will put in a word for Gipsies?" What about us – who likes us except our close relatives? Who will put in a word for us? People must remember this: if we allow ourselves to dislike some people and not to put in as much as a word for those people – Gipsies, Tatars, Turks, Azerbaijanians, Lithuanians, Jews, Armenians – love will leave this land together with those who are persecuted, and after they have all gone, we will start killing each other for too fair hair, for too high cheek-bones, for too black eyes. We will perish without a trace. And good riddance. ■

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